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ABSTRACT 
 
For a transitional market with a short history like that of Vietnam, corporate governance is a critical area 
of improvement. The issuance of Circular 121 in 2012 marked an important milestone of corporate 
governance reform in Vietnam as it includes stricter and more well-defined regulations learned from 
international best practices. Among them is the requirement that independent directors should make up 
at least one-third of the board of directors. Although improving financial reporting is not at the heart of 
Circular 121, this Circular is expected to reduce earnings management through the mandatory 
requirement of board independence. 
Using data collected from a sample of 523 non-financial listed firms from 2009 – 2016, this study finds no 
significant relationship between earnings management and the proportion of independent directors, and 
Circular 121 has no impact on this relationship. These results are consistent across different regression 
approaches and various robustness tests, suggesting that board independence and corporate governance 
reform are not effective tools in mitigating earnings management. 
 
Keywords: earnings management, corporate governance reform, board independence, independent 
directors, Vietnam.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Earnings are believed to be the premier financial information as they provide robust indications about the 
prospects of a firm (Lev, 1989). Companies with healthy earnings have a better valuation, attract more 
investors, and can raise capital at favorable terms. Therefore, delivering a good earnings performance is 
the most important task of executive managers. When contracting with managers, shareholders typically 
use earnings as a basis for awarding compensation (Peasnell et al., 2000). Managers might even be 
dismissed if the financial performance of the company is extremely poor (Weisbach, 1988). This means 
unfavorable earnings results can leave a direct negative impact on managerial wealth. Consequently, 
managers may have incentives to opportunistically manage reported earnings (Dechow et al., 2010). 
However, as earnings management distort the true performance of firms, investors are unable to make 
informed decisions and the efficiency of the stock market is seriously impacted. The collapse of Enron, a 
public firm that manages earnings to a fraudulent extreme, caused a major disruption in the U.S. stock 
market in 2002. From USD 90 a share, Enron stock was traded at 50 cents one year after the scandal. This 
event has taken a massive USD 67 billion of shareholder wealth out of the economy. Projects in the energy 
industry were put on hold while electricity and natural gas companies were facing higher capital costs due 
to investors’ skepticism.  
The problem of earnings management in Vietnam was not any better. During the short history of the 
Vietnamese stock market, investors witnesses a series of accounting scandals including the notorious case 
of Truong Thanh Furniture Corporation1. By the end of 2008, 194 out of 357 listed firms in Vietnam had 
differences in net income before and after auditing, and for 47 firms, the difference was over 50%.2 From 
2009 to 2017, although the magnitude of difference between audited and unaudited net income reduced, 
the number of firms that have disparity increased. 540 out of 709 listed companies had unaudited net 
profit in 2017 different from audited numbers.3  
These statistics alarmed the Vietnamese government and investors about loopholes in the Vietnamese 
corporate governance that is still in the early stage of development (Connelly et al., 2017). The Vietnamese 
stock market is relatively young and nebulous compared to the history of the global stock market. After 
the Vietnam War ended in 1975, it took more than 25 years to reunite and rebuild the whole country. 
Only in 2000 did Vietnam establish the first stock exchange i.e. the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange 
                                                          
1 In the second quarter of 2016, Truong Thanh Furniture Corporation published financial statements with a loss of 
VND 1,123 billion (approximately USD 50.1 million) while the previous quarter saw a profit of VND 54 billion. As 
explained by Ernst & Young Vietnam, the loss was caused by VND 980 billion missing inventory which made cost of 
goods sold in the first half of 2016 soared to 1.690 billion, two times the revenue. The fact that Truong Thanh had 
not made any provision for inventories and bad receivables means the income could have been inflated for years. 
2 Trung Truc (2011) https://enternews.vn/van-nan-lai-gia-lo-that-59204.html 
3 Han Dong (2018). https://vietstock.vn/2018/04/lech-pha-lai-lo-sau-kiem-toan-co-phai-la-ve-sao-cho-dep-737-
597304.htm 
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(HOSE). Five years later, in 2005, the second one, Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), came into operations. The 
two stock exchanges are supposed to facilitate the “equitization”4 of numerous State-owned enterprises 
which are the results of a centrally-planned economy during wartime. However, the market economy of 
Vietnam, a communist state, still follows a socialist orientation, meaning that the government continues 
to hold substantial ownership in large firms even after equitization. During this period, no specific 
corporate governance regulations were established and listed firms in Vietnam were mainly regulated by 
The Enterprise Law. It was not until 2007 that the first Corporate Governance Code for Vietnamese listed 
firms was put into place following Decision 12/2007/QĐ-BTC. However, the effectiveness of this code 
remained questionable as Vietnam entered a dynamic yet turbulent stage of economic development 
which was characterized by the participation in WTO in 2007 and the financial crisis from 2008 to 2009.  
The social, political, and cultural context in Vietnam continues to poses numerous corporate governance 
challenges to different players in the market, including the regulators, the firms, and the investors. This 
situation is deemed even more serious after the collapse of Vinashin, “the worst-ever financial scandal in 
Vietnam”, in 2010. 5 It was no surprise that the Corporate Governance Scorecard published by the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC) revealed a steady downward trend in corporate governance 
performance among Vietnamese listed firms from 2009 to 2011. 6 Responding to the situation, the 2007 
Corporate Governance Code was replaced by Circular 121/2012/TT-BTC (hereafter, Circular 121) dated 
July 26th, 2012. The most notable change was the requirement of board independence: at least one-third 
of the members of the Board of Directors in all listed companies must be independent. This is also the 
first legal document in Vietnam that clearly distinguished and defined the concepts of “non-executive 
directors” and “independent directors”. Accordingly, independent directors, besides being non-executive, 
must not have a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal 
advisors, or external auditors of the firm. 
 
1.2 Research question and objective 
Since the establishment of Circular 121, no study has attempted to examine its effectiveness in increasing 
board independence and reducing earnings management among Vietnamese listed firms. However, there 
are reasons to reckon that a more independent board helps to mitigate earnings management. The 
benefits of earnings management are accrued primarily to executive directors in the form of increased 
compensation and reduced likelihood of dismissal (Weisbach, 1988). In contrast, independent directors 
                                                          
4 Equitization means partial privatization where the State remains the controlling shareholder after the 
privatization. In fact, this term is coined by Vietnamese politicians and its use outside Vietnam is not popular. 
5 Vinashin or The Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group is a State-owned Enterprise established in 1996. In 2010, 
Vinashin defaulted on its first payment on a $600 million loan to creditors. And in 2012, the company ran up debts 
of up to $4.5 billion. The reasons for such failure is attributed to rapid expansion, financial crisis, weak corporate 
governance, and weak expertise of the Board of Directors.  
6 Data is collected from Vietnam’s 100 largest publicly listed companies, representing more than 80% of the 
combined market capitalization on the Hanoi (HNX) and Ho Chi Minh (HOSE) stock exchanges. Corporate governance 
of each firm was assessed against five areas recognized by the OECD as keys to good corporate governance.  
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face potentially significant costs from earnings management such as the loss of reputation (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). The absence of significant benefits and the risks of associated costs from earnings 
management provides independent directors with sufficient incentives to monitor the financial reporting 
process. Therefore, introducing more independent members to the board may help to reduce earnings 
manipulation. This study aims at verifying this proposition with the following research question: 
Does a corporate governance reform following the issuance of Circular 121 moderate the relationship, 
if any, between board independence and earnings management among Vietnamese listed firms? 
Based on a sample of 523 non-financial listed firms from 2009 – 2016, this study finds that there is no 
significant relationship between board independence and earnings management, and Circular 121 has no 
impact on this relationship. These results are consistent across different measurements of earnings 
management and other robustness tests. This suggests that independent directors in Vietnamese listed 
firms do not discharge their monitoring role effectively to reduce earnings management. Circular 121, by 
requiring higher board independence, does not help to improve the situation.  
 
1.3 Contributions 
My study contributes in three ways. First, there is a lack of empirical studies in corporate governance and 
finance and accounting in Vietnam (Vu et al., 2018). Due to the unique characteristics of a transitional 
economy with a special orientation, Vietnam is often not included in many cross-countries corporate 
governance studies around the world (Tran & Holloway, 2014). 7 Consequently, despite having strong 
growth and many achievements, the Vietnamese market is still relatively under-researched. There is a 
need for more studies of present-day accounting, particularly the reporting practices and corporate 
governance of listed firms, in newly established stock markets such as Vietnam. Therefore, my study 
contributes to the existing literature of corporate governance and earnings management of Vietnam. 
Second, to my best knowledge, no prior study has attempted to examine the moderating effect of a 
corporate governance reform on the relationship between earnings management and board 
independence in Vietnam. For example, Essa et al. (2016) and Le et al. (2016) study earnings management 
and board independence among Vietnamese listed firms and find no significant correlation. However, 
these studies do not examine the impact of Circular 121 in their study period. By taking Circular 121 as a 
prominent example of corporate governance reform in the Vietnamese market, my study would be the 
first to fill this gap. The results of my study potentially provide regulators, policymakers, and investors 
with practical insights. Accordingly, regulators may design appropriate corporate governance policies or 
frameworks to effectively control earnings management, and investors may develop an understanding of 
an ongoing issue in Vietnam. 
                                                          
7 The authors mention that the book “Corporate Governance and Accountability” (Solomon, 2007) provides an 
analysis of corporate governance in 36 countries around the world, including developing countries in Southeast Asia 
such as Thailand and Indonesia but not Vietnam. Similarly, highly cited papers on corporate governance around the 
world including those of Shleifer & Vishny (1997) and  La Porta et al. (1999) did not include Vietnam. 
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Third, my study adopts a stricter measure for board independence. When measuring the level of board 
independence, earnings management studies in Vietnam and other countries typically use the percentage 
of non-executive directors (i.e. Dechow et al., 1996; Essa et al., 2016; Le et al., 2016; Peasnell et al., 2000) 
and these studies do not examine the degree to which non-executive directors are independent of the 
organization. Non-executive directors may still have a material relationship with the company in several 
ways. For example, they may be large shareholders of the firm or they may be executive managers of the 
firm’s related entities. Therefore, these directors still have the power to participate in and manipulate the 
earnings reporting process of the firm. My study uses the proportion of independent directors to measure 
board independence. An independent director in my study is not an executive manager of the firm or 
related entities (i.e. subsidiaries, parent company, sister companies), not a large shareholder or a 
representative of a large shareholder, and not an employee of the firm’s business partners, legal advisors, 
or external auditors. This definition reflects a higher level of independence compared to non-executive 
managers. 
 
1.4 Outline 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the key concepts, theoretical 
framework, and empirical evidence based on which I formulate the hypotheses. A sub-section dedicated 
to explaining the Vietnamese institutional context is also included. In Chapter 3, the research 
methodology, regression models, and data collection are explained. In Chapter 4, the findings are 
displayed and discussed. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the paper by summarizing the findings and point 
out several limitations. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the existing literature most relevant to my study. First, a brief introduction to 
corporate governance is provided. Second, the chapter elaborates on four important theories based on 
which the hypotheses are formulated. Third, empirical findings on earnings management, board 
independence, and corporate governance reform are summarized. Fourth, a specific section covering the 
institutional context and empirical evidence of the Vietnamese market is included. Finally, the hypotheses 
are presented and explained. 
2.1 A brief introduction of corporate governance 
The concept of corporate governance dated back to at least the 1600s when the East India Company 
introduces the Court of Directors which separated ownership and control (Wright et al., 2013). Then in 
the 16th and 17th centuries, the formation of major chartered companies, including the Hudson's Bay 
Company and the Levant Company, created the conflict between investors and managers. However, 
amidst the widespread prosperity of American corporations in the subsequent decades and especially 
during the World War II, the term was not in official use until 1976 when the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) brought it to the Federal Register for the first time: SEC began to treat issues of 
managerial accountability as a part of its reform agenda.  
Since then, corporate governance quickly gained international momentum, as punctuated by a series of 
corporate failures and systematic crises. 8 In 1991, Britain followed the step of the U.S. and established 
the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. Immediately after its establishment, 
the Committee launched several prominent corporate governance reports including the Cadbury Report 
(1992), the Greenbury Report (1994), and the Hampel Report (1995) in response to a decline in 
accountability of top executives that led to the collapses of major British public companies. Although not 
having the force of law, the Cadbury Report (1992) was adopted as part of the listing requirement by the 
London Stock Exchange and it also achieved notoriety internationally as a model for corporate governance 
codes. For example, this practice was followed by South Africa with the King Report (1994), by France with 
the Vienot Report (1995) and by the Netherlands with the Peters Report (1996).  
To date, more than 500 codes of best practices and set of principles have been written in 109 countries 
and regions. 9 These codes, however, follow domestic regulations and are dispersed in nature (IFC, 2010). 
As globalization call for a single manual, a handful of international benchmarks have been developed to 
provide uniform guidance on good governance. Among these, only the principles of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (published in 1999 and revised in 2004) address 
concerns of both policymakers and businesses while focusing on the entire governance framework 
                                                          
8 Such events include crisis of the 1970s in the U.K., the U.S. savings and loan debacle of the 1980s, the 1998 financial 
crisis in Russia, the 1997-1998 financial crisis in Asia, the Enron scandal in 2002, the Parmalat scandal in 2004, and 
the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, among others (International Finance Corporation, 2010) 
9 A complete up-to-date list can be found at the website of European Corporate Governance Institute: 
ecgi.global/content/codes 
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(shareholder rights, stakeholders, disclosure and board practices). The OECD Principles have gained 
worldwide acceptance as a reference for a good corporate governance framework. Many national 
corporate governance codes have been developed based on these principles (IFC, 2010). Vietnam’s 
corporate governance regulations were also developed based on the OECD Principles and contain certain 
rules that conform to international best practices. 
As corporate governance evolves over time and across countries, there is no one-fits-all definition for this 
concept. According to Claessens & Yurtoglu (2013), when studying firms within one country, it makes the 
most sense to define corporate governance within a behavioral framework: corporate governance is the 
actual behavior of a firm, as revealed by its performance, efficiency, growth, financial structure, and 
treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders. Nonetheless, corporate governance must not be 
confused with corporate management in this regard. Corporate governance focuses on the structure and 
processes to ensure a fair, responsible, transparent, and accountable corporate behavior while corporate 
management focuses on the tools required to operate the business. Corporate governance has a higher 
level of direction that ensures that the company is managed in the best interests of its owners. 
On the other hand, when comparing firms in different countries, a framework concerning the rules under 
which firms operate should be taken into account. These rules, coming from the legal system, judicial 
system, financial market, and labor market, tend to vary across countries (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). 
Within a comparative view, the question arises on how broadly to define corporate governance. Under a 
narrower view, most definitions center around the relationship between managers and shareholders i.e. 
the firm owners. “Corporate governance deals with how suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; p. 737). Following this 
definition, the focus of corporate governance would be on how outside investors protect themselves 
against the expropriation of insiders.  
A broader view of corporate governance, on the other hand, concentrates on the relationship between 
the company and all of its stakeholders. Zingales (1998) regards corporate governance as “the complex 
set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm” (p.499). 
Under this definition, corporate governance takes into account not only the owners but also other 
stakeholders (i.e. suppliers, consumers, regulatory bodies, state agencies, and the local community) and 
it also encompasses the issue of corporate social responsibilities and other non-commercial aspects like 
culture and environment. However, good corporate social responsibilities do not necessarily translate into 
good corporate governance. Although investing in socially responsible activities boost a firm’s reputation 
and public goodwill, it does not mean that the firm is well-governed. Eventually, Enron collapsed while 
positioning itself as “the world’s leading renewable energy company” (Bradley, 2009).  
Although different in their scope, these definitions share the key focus of shareholder and creditor rights 
protection. This focus provides a framework to guide a company's objectives, management, internal 
controls, and performance measurement. Good corporate governance helps firms build trust with 
investors and the community. As a result, corporate governance promotes financial viability by creating 
sustainable investment opportunities for market participants. 
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2.2 Important theories in corporate governance  
No matter how broad or narrow corporate governance is defined, corporate governance is embraced by 
major theoretical frameworks. The most common ones are the agency theory, stewardship theory, 
stakeholder theory, and resource dependence theory. 
2.2.1 Agency theory 
Modern corporations are characterized by the separation of ownership and control, meaning the owners 
of the firm (the principal) delegate the decision-making authority to other persons (the agent) (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Such separation gives rise to the “principal-agent problem” as the agents who make 
important decisions are not the main “residual claimants” and therefore do not bear a major share of the 
wealth effects following their decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This suggests that there are circumstances 
where the agent will not act in the interests of the principal. A typical example is when he or she 
appropriates the firm’s resources for personal consumption. Another example is the lack of motivation to 
devote significant effort and go through all the troubles to search for new profitable opportunities which 
would boost the firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Altogether, these deviations from the owners' 
interest are the “agency costs”. As in the two examples above, an agency cost can be a direct cost that 
incurs from structuring and monitoring the contractual principal-agent relationships; or it can also be an 
indirect cost when the firm value is substantially lower than if the owners exercise direct control. 
To ensure alignment in the interests of managers and shareholders, many companies appoint a board of 
directors to act as the firm’s monitoring mechanism. They are responsible to recruit, monitor, and 
compensate managers (monitoring role); and to advise, approve, and participate in important decisions 
made by managers (advisory role) (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Shareholders may also join forces to monitor 
managers. However, shareholders differ in their incentives to spend resources on monitoring managers. 
Powerful shareholders who own a large stake in the firm have strong power and higher incentives to 
actively engage in and voice in the firm management. In contrast, shareholders owning a minimal portion 
of shares have very little motivation and power to do so and may simply free-ride on larger shareholders. 
Additionally, due to the difference in their ownership, the interests of major shareholders may not always 
align with those of minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Larger owners who have more control 
of the firm may deprive smaller owners of the right to appropriate returns on their investment. 
Consequently, corporations characterized by concentrated ownership are also exposed to the “principal-
principal problem”. Thus, ensuring fairness among different shareholders has been an important function 
of the board of directors and a key pillar in corporate governance.  
2.2.2 Stewardship theory 
Although the agency theory has dominated literature in corporate governance, it has been challenged by 
the stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Originated from sociology and psychology, the 
stewardship theory offers an alternative perspective of managerial motivation. The key difference 
between the two theories is how they interpret the “model of man”. Agency theory assumes a self-
interested and opportunistic behavior of the manager. In contrast, stewardship theory posits that the 
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manager is motivated by a variety of non-economic incentives to be a good role model: he or she strives 
to be a steward of the shareholders. The justifications for this behavior can be attributed to the need for 
reputation and achievement, the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, and the respect for 
authority and work ethics (Muth & Donaldson, 1998).  
Agency theory postulates a clear separation of interests between managers and owners. However, in 
many cases, they may sit on the same side of the table and have overlapping interests. For example, to 
the degree that an executive feels his or her future welfare (e.g. employment security, income, pension 
rights) is bound by the current employment with the company, then the executive may perceive that 
maximizing the firm value is also maximizing his or her interests (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
Taking into account the stewardship theory which places trust at the center of the relationship between 
managers and shareholders, the shareholders should, therefore, create an effective governance 
mechanism to empower managers and give them more autonomy in delivering corporate goals. This can 
be done through a flexible governance structure, open information disclosure, and especially regular 
recognition and rewards. Placing excessive monitoring on the managers might only hamper firms in 
achieving a maximized value. Thus, the stewardship theory does not focus on the opportunistic motivation 
of the managers, but rather on facilitating an empowering organizational structure.  
2.2.3 Stakeholder theory 
In alignment with the broader definition of corporate governance, the stakeholder theory postulates that 
managers should make decisions that benefit not only the residual claimants but also all other the 
stakeholders in a firm. The principals served by the agents now include all parties who may impact or be 
impacted by the firm’s welfare. They can be shareholders, creditors, employees, customers, communities, 
government officials, and to a broader extent, the environment. 
Although the stakeholder theory is gaining popularity among academic researchers and receiving formal 
endorsements from professional and governmental organizations, it is susceptible to criticism.  Jensen 
(2001) pointed out that the theory fails to provide a single-minded view of corporate objectives that 
distinguish economic corporations from other types of business. If value maximization is not at the heart 
of its purpose, how a publicly-held company differs from a social enterprise? The stakeholder theory 
neither provides a framework for managers to solve the conflict of interests among different types of 
shareholders. That being said, this theory probably causes “managerial confusion, conflict, inefficiency, 
and perhaps even competitive failure” by directing managers to serve many masters (Jensen, 2001, p.9). 
However, this does not mean that the stakeholder theory and the value maximization objective of 
corporations are mutually exclusive. Although a set of diffused corporate goals will not do any good, a 
failure to incorporate the welfare of other stakeholders might destroy firm value. Indeed, the two 
seemingly contrasting perspectives can be harmonized if they are put in a proper framework. Jensen 
(2001) coined a concept that he called “enlightened stakeholder theory”. This new version, while focusing 
on meeting the different demands of stakeholders, accepts value maximization as a single long-term 
objective for making tradeoffs when conflicts arise among corporate stakeholders.  
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2.2.4 Resource dependence theory 
The resource dependence theory posits that the firm performance is determined by its unique resources 
which are the cornerstones of its competitive advantages and which cannot be attributed to industry 
conditions (Peteraf, 1993). According to Barney (1991), this theory is built on two assumptions. First, 
companies within an industry are assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of the resources they own and 
the strategies they pursue. Second, these resources and strategies may not be perfectly imitable and thus 
the heterogeneity can be maintained over the long run. Examples of such resources include human capital 
resources (e.g. training, experience, capabilities, relationships, insights of managers and workers) and 
organizational capital resources (e.g. reporting, planning and controlling structure, and relations with 
other firms) (Barney, 1991).  
Under the resource dependence theory, a firm must constantly search, acquire, and upgrade its resources 
to remain competitive (Wernerfelt, 1984). The board of directors plays a critical role in facilitating the 
acquisition and development of competitive resources (James & Joseph, 2015). Through their superior 
expertise, experience, and network, directors can help the firm to create connections with external parties 
and gain further access to resources. In essence, the board is expected to actively engage in generating 
resources to secure firm performance and overcome market rivalry and volatility (Hillman, et al., 2000). 
This can be done by increasing board diversity. For example, independent directors or female directors 
possess different sets of resources that can contribute to good corporate governance.  Considerable 
resource heterogeneity also exists among various shareholder categories. According to Douma et al., 
(2006), different types of shareholders, being either foreign or domestic, and financial or strategic, have 
different resources that can be incorporated into firms’ competitive advantages which generate good 
performance and corporate governance.  
 
2.3 Earnings management 
Good corporate governance increases investors’ confidence which allows firms to attract capital at lower 
costs. It also reduces market vulnerability and helps to develop the financial market. In contrast, weak 
corporate governance discourages investors and gives rise to many problems, one of which is earnings 
management. A survey conducted by Dichev et al. (2013) reports that about 20% of firms manage earnings 
to misrepresent economic performance, and for such firms, 10% of earnings per share is typically 
managed.  
2.3.1 Definition of earnings management 
Simply speaking, earnings management is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of 
generally accepted accounting principles to bring about the desired level of reported earnings” (Davidson, 
Stickney, & Weil, 1987). Perhaps regulatory bodies have a more negative view on earnings management, 
defining it as ‘‘the practice of distorting the true financial performance of the company’’ (United States 
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Securities and Exchange Commission). 10 Earnings management is not necessarily illegal as long as 
managers use their discretion within the limits of accounting standards. However, it is often the 
antecedent of financial crimes if committed to a fraudulent extreme, as in the examples of Enron. 
Earnings management has a lot in common with earnings quality. According to Dechow et al. (2010) 
“higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of a firm’s financial performance” 
(p.344). Therefore, highly managed earnings have low quality. However, the absence of earnings 
management does not guarantee a high earnings quality, because other factors contribute to earnings 
quality (Lo, 2008). For example, calculation errors and the use of poor accounting standards leads to lower 
earnings quality. Nevertheless, taking these contributing factors as constant, there is a very close 
connection between earnings management and earnings quality and many studies use earnings 
management as an inverse proxy for earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010).  
The two main tools of earnings management are accounting accrual and real activity. The accrual method 
concerns the abuse of accounting items that are not directly related to immediate cash flows such as 
provisions and depreciation and amortization. Although accrual manipulation is relatively simple to carry 
out, it is easy to be detected via monitoring mechanisms, such as external auditors (Zang, 2011). Audit 
restatements are signals of accrual earnings management and stock prices tend to decrease following an 
announcement of restatements (Dechow et al., 2010). 
In contrast, real activity method refers to the manipulation of reported financial performance through 
actual business transactions that reflect suboptimal economic decisions (Campa, 2019). Some examples 
include the sales of goods under special discounts, overproduction, cutting or delaying expenses, sales of 
assets, changes in R&D expenditure (Roychowdhury, 2006). As real activity earnings management is not 
a divergence from accounting standards, it is more difficult to be detected. Nevertheless, carrying out 
transactions that are economically suboptimal leaves negative impacts on the firm’s future profitability. 
Eventually, it reduces shareholder value (Campa, 2019). 
Extant literature suggests that firms engage in earnings management by real activity or accounting 
accruals or both. However, as real earnings management is costly, firms use accrual earnings management 
to a much higher extent (Lobo & Zhou, 2009). As real earnings management is harder to detect, my study 
focuses on investigating accrual earnings management. 
2.3.2 Motivations of earnings management 
Earnings, the "bottom line," are widely believed to be the premier information provided in financial 
statements and they lie at the heart of many valuation models. Investors are motivated to invest in 
companies with healthy earnings. As a result, managers find good incentives to manage earnings figures. 
According to Kellogg (1991), influencing investors’ perception of firm value is the primary motivation for 
earnings manipulation. This is because firms can raise additional financing on more favorable terms and 
existing shareholders may sell their stocks at higher prices. Consistent with this view, Dechow et al. (1996) 
                                                          
10 SEC Docket, Volume 70, No. 16, Part 2, p.1775  
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find that an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at 
lower costs. This problem is especially pronounced when earnings fall below certain thresholds such as a 
loss, growth or profitability targets, and analysts’ consensus forecasts (Peasnell et al., 2005). 
Another explanation for earnings management is that when contracting with managers, shareholders 
commonly use earnings as a basis for awarding bonuses and stock options (Peasnell et al., 2000). 
Therefore, bad earnings results can leave negative consequences for senior management’s wealth. 
According to DeFond & Park (1997), poor management performance increases the likelihood of dismissal 
under the assumption that good performance in the current year will not compensate for poor 
performance in the future. Thus, when the current year's performance is poor, executives reduce the 
chance of dismissal by borrowing future earnings by using income-increasing accruals, and vice versa 
(DeFond & Park, 1997). However, income is not always adjusted upward. Based on a survey of 169 Chief 
Financial Officers of public companies, Dichev et al. (2013) reported that 60% of earnings management is 
income-increasing, and 40% is income-decreasing. This finding is somewhat contrasting to the emphasis 
on income-increasing accruals in existing literature but is consistent with the “cookie-jar reserving” and 
“big baths” hypotheses (Dichev et al., 2013). DeFond & Park (1997) find that managers borrow earnings 
from the future to increase earnings of the current period when they expect future earnings to be 
promising while current earnings are poor. Conversely, when current earnings targets are met but 
expected future earnings prospects are gloomy, managers reserve current earnings for possible use in the 
future.  
Managers also manipulate accounting accruals to smooth income due to political costs and employee 
costs. Benston and Krasney (1978) argue that large fluctuations in earnings may attract the attention of 
regulators. Sharp upward earnings fluctuations may be perceived as a signal of monopolistic practices; 
sharp downward fluctuations may signal crisis and cause regulators to act. Also, employees or union shall 
be sensitive to fluctuations in earnings. Significant increases may generate demands for wage increases; 
sharp decreases may impose costs due to fears of financial distress. Consequently, firms having a high 
propensity of government scrutiny and a strong union have incentives to smooth earnings. 
Earnings management is also related to tax motivation. Studying the relationship between earnings 
management and tax-rate reduction following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the U.S., Guenther (1994) 
find that big companies report significantly negative current accruals to defer operating income for the 
years before the tax rate reduction. Similarly, Maydew (1997) find that firms with net operating loss 
carrybacks deferred taxable income and recognized more nonrecurring losses-actions that increased tax 
refunds from pre-1986 high-tax years. In contrast, firms that took large amounts of investment tax credits 
in the past manage income less. However, Guenther (1994) also notes that other incentives related to 
performance and compensation might make it costly for managers to do shift earnings in anticipation of 
a tax-rate reduction. For this reason, many firms may choose to forego current tax savings to avoid 
reducing income. 
However, not all income management motivations are opportunistic. Bowen et al. (1987) suggest that 
accounting earnings generally provide a better indication of an enterprise's present and future 
12 
 
performance than cash flows which is limited to the cash receipts and payments. There is also evidence 
that discretionary accruals predict future profitability and dividend changes (Subramanyam, 1996). Thus, 
several studies argue that earnings management may be beneficial because it potentially enhances the 
information value of earnings. Jiraporn et al. (2008) find that in firms with lower agency costs, there is a 
positive relationship between earnings management and firm value. This suggests that managers may 
manage earnings to communicate private information to shareholders and the public. According to 
Subramanyam (1996), managers may smooth income to counteract the effect of temporary movements 
in cash flows and profitability. Managers may also use their discretion to communicate their knowledge 
about firm profitability which is yet to be reflected in the historical reported earnings. Consistent with this 
notion, Subramanyam (1996) find that discretionary accruals are priced by the stock market, suggesting 
that investors reward firms for disclosing private information. 
2.3.3 Impacts of earnings management 
Though earnings management might not be illegal and can even be beneficial in certain cases, it is often 
criticized due to numerous negative consequences if it is carried out with opportunism. First, unreliable 
earnings information distorts the stock market efficiency. Under the absence of accurate earnings 
reporting, investors suffer from adverse selection bias because they cannot make informed decisions 
(Chung et al., 2009). Investors could estimate the magnitude of firm value that has been inflated and 
discount the stock accordingly once restatements are published (Dechow et al., 1996). However, because 
the magnitude of earnings management is difficult to be estimated, there is an uncertainty among 
investors that widen the bid-ask spread to “compensate for the increased risk of losing to more informed 
traders” and protect themselves against adverse selection costs (Dechow et al., 1996, p.6). A higher firm 
risk as perceived by investors, in turn, increases the firm cost of equity (Dechow et al., 2010). Based on a 
large sample of 6386 seasoned equity issues in the U.S., Teoh et al. (1998) find that issuers who managed 
income upward before the offering have lower long-run abnormal stock returns and net income after the 
issue. The high bid-ask spreads, in turn, lower equity liquidity (Chung et al., 2009). 
Second, a firm with less reliable earnings reporting tends to have a higher cost of debt. Dechow et al. 
(1996) report that firms experiencing a significant increase in their cost of debt following the revelation 
of earnings overstatements. This suggests that manipulating earnings initially enables firms to enjoy a 
lower cost of debt, but once the earnings manipulation is revealed, often through restatements post-
audit, these firms experience significant increases in their cost of debt. Francis et al. (2005) document that 
firms with higher accruals have a higher interest rate and a lower credit rating. Graham et al. (2008) report 
that banks use tighter loan contracting terms following their clients’ publishing of restatements. Bhojraj 
and Swaminathan (2007) find that firms with high accruals have lower one-year bond returns. 
Finally, earnings management also increases litigation propensity (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004), especially 
when the earnings pattern is changed substantially (Lev et al., 2008). DuCharme et al., (2004) report that 
the incidence of lawsuits involving stock offers of U.S. firms is significantly positively related to abnormal 
accruals around the offer. The study finds that accruals reversals are more pronounced and stock returns 
are lower for sued firms than for those that are not sued. 
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2.4 Corporate governance mechanisms to control opportunistic earnings management 
Although earnings management can enhance the information value of earnings in certain cases, it reflects 
managerial opportunistic behavior in most other cases, especially under weak corporate governance. 
Earnings management increases the information asymmetry problem which deters investors from making 
the optimal investment decisions. When financial reporting is not trustworthy, firms face multiple 
consequences, and the capital market efficiency is also impaired. Consequently, earnings management is 
an agency cost. Because poor oversight of management under weak governance is an important catalyst 
for financial frauds (Dechow et al., 1996), opportunistic earnings management can be mitigated by 
strengthening corporate governance mechanisms. There are various mechanisms to control earnings 
management, such as increasing board diversity, designing an optimal ownership structure, or 
strengthening regulations. However, this section will focus on the two mechanisms most relevant to my 
study, namely board independence (i.e. internal mechanism), and corporate governance regulations (i.e. 
external mechanism). 
2.4.1 Board independence 
Background 
Designed to curtail managerial opportunism, the board of directors is a crucial internal control mechanism 
and has been at the heart of corporate governance research. Directors serve as a “top-level court of 
appeals” (Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 314) and as “shareholders’ first line of defense against incompetent 
management” (Weisbach, 1988, p.431). They are responsible for monitoring managers on behalf and in 
the best interest of all shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
The key question when establishing a board of directors is who should be appointed. Fama & Jensen 
(1983) note that the board would not be able to discharge its monitoring role unless it includes several 
top managers. Top executive directors expedite the flow of information from lower managerial levels to 
the board and facilitate important discussions related to the firm’s business operations. However, the 
dominance of powerful managers, typically the CEO, may lead to “the absence of separation of decision 
management and decision control” (p. 314). Accordingly, executive managers, using their power and 
superior insights of the firms, possibly dilute the board’s ability to provide independent judgment.  
These problems can be solved by balancing the number of internal executive members with outside 
independent members. Due to their independence from the firm, these directors can perform agency-
related tasks such as appointing, compensating, and firing executive managers. In contrast, inside 
directors have their responsibilities highly tied to those of the CEO and hence they are generally unable 
or unwilling to remove incumbent CEOs. Therefore, independent directors help to reduce the principal-
agent problem. Independent directors also play an important role in minimizing the principal-principal 
problem. As opposed to internal manager directors, they have fewer connections with large shareholders 
and thus, are more likely to ensure a fair treatment towards minority shareholders (Kim et al., 2007). 
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The stewardship theory and the stakeholder theory also support a more independent board. Independent 
directors often have fewer benefits from managing earnings. The benefits are expected to accrue 
primarily to executive directors in the form of increased compensation and reduced likelihood of dismissal 
(Weisbach, 1988). However, independent directors who are respected leaders in their area of expertise 
often face significant costs from earnings management such as the loss of reputation as effective monitors 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988). Fama & Jensen (1983) explain that outside directors have 
incentives to develop their reputation as experts in decision control and are more concerned about their 
image in the eyes of all stakeholders, not only the shareholders. Therefore, they are motivated to ensure 
the effective monitoring of the company because serving as stewards of well-run companies signals their 
competence and prestige to the job market. Consequently, outside directors are assumed to be less 
influenced by management and therefore, discharge a better monitoring role compared to inside 
directors. For example, Hermalin & Weisbach (1998) suggest that a CEO who performs poorly is more 
likely to be removed when the board is more independent. Similarly, Weisbach (1988) report a strong 
correlation between prior performance and the probability of a CEO resignation for companies with 
outsider-dominated boards than for companies with insider-dominated boards.  
Under the resource dependence theory, outside directors, due to their different social and human capital 
may bring diversified expertise to the board. The more outside members present on the board, the more 
resources available to be embedded in the strategies to maximize firm value (James & Joseph, 2015). 
Peasnell et al. (2000) suggest that non-executives directors often hold senior management positions in 
other large firms. Due to their diverse experience, they are relatively familiar with financial reporting 
issues and can identify misreporting cases.  
Empirical evidence 
Altogether, the above discussion suggests that outside directors, due to their independence, capabilities, 
and personal motivations can mitigate earnings management.  A magnitude of contemporary findings is 
in alignment with this view. Using a logit regression analysis of 75 fraud and 75 no-fraud firms, Beasley 
(1996)  shows that no-fraud firms have a higher proportion of outside board members than fraud firms. 
Dechow et al. (1996) use a sample of firms targeted by the SEC for allegedly overstating earnings, find that 
these firms are more likely to have boards of directors dominated by executive managers. Based on a 
sample of 692 firm-years observations, Klein (2002) finds that earnings management as measured by 
abnormal accruals is negatively related to board independence. Based on a sample of Spanish firms, Saona 
et al. (2020) find that independent boards constrain managers’ capacity to manage earnings. These 
findings suggest that the inclusion of outside members on the board increases the board's monitoring 
effectiveness for the prevention of financial statement fraud, as predicted by the agency theory. 
However, there is also other mixed evidence. For example, Ye (2014) and Sarkar et al. (2008) documents 
a positive relationship between independent directors and the magnitude of earnings management 
among Chinese firms and Indian firms. Similarly, Bao & Lewellyn (2017) conduct an empirical analysis of 
1200 firms in 24 emerging markets and find that proportion of outside directors positively correlate with 
earnings management.   
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There can be several explanations for the second strand of findings. The first explanation concerns the 
CEO’s power within the firm. Hermalin & Weisbach (1998) suggest that board independence decreases 
throughout a CEO's tenure. When CEOs are extremely able and powerful, they can use their power to 
ensure a relatively weak but independent board throughout their career. Hermalin & Weisbach (1998) 
note that because the proxy committee to elect independent directors is appointed by existing 
management, strong CEO can impose his will on the director selection process. Consequently, 
management can select directors that are independent by regulations but still unduly influenced by 
management. Thus, increasing outsider representation on boards in some cases may simply be “window 
dressing” (Romano, 2005). 
The second explanation is consistent with the argument that independent directors lack sufficient 
business information and knowledge to effectively discharge their monitoring role (Uribe-Bohorquez et 
al., 2018). Weisbach (1988) suggests that independent directors often have to rely on publicly available 
performance measures and tend to be short-sighted to remove managers following one bad year, ignoring 
the fact that these managers may maximize the firm’s long-term value. In contrast, executive directors 
make better business judgments and decisions as they have more insider information than what is 
reflected in public information. From these arguments, it can be seen that the effectiveness of 
independent directors is conditional on the firm’s information cost such as the availability, homogeneity, 
and accuracy of analysts’ forecasts (Duchin et al., 2010). Independent directors considerably enhance firm 
performance when the cost of information acquisition is low, but they hurt performance when such cost 
is high. In this regard, outside directors can be a firm’s liabilities rather than resources.  
Finally, independent directors are responsible for removing bad management, but they may not have the 
incentives to do so. Independent directors without a significant stake in the firm have no incentive to 
cause trouble for management, especially under the context where individual relationships are important 
(Vuong et al., 2013). Besides, when outside directors serve directorships in too many companies, they 
might be under-committed (Sarkar et al., 2008). The most common problem shared by busy directors is 
the reduced ability to attend board meetings, annual shareholder meetings, and other committee 
meetings although these are the forums where they can formally participate and demand accountability 
from management. 
In summary, the majority of the literature suggests that independent directors discharge a better 
monitoring role compared to executive directors and they are likely to suppress the opportunistic 
behavior of managers to manipulate earnings results. However, simply being independent is not sufficient 
to be an effective director. Independent directors should maintain their control over powerful managers 
to not be influenced by them. Internal information costs should also be lowered and rewards should be 
given to motivate outside directors to closely engage in the firm business so that they can provide valid 
judgments over important decisions of the firm. 
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2.4.2 Corporate governance reform 
Background 
The view that independent directors help to improve the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms 
and that there is a correlation between board independence and earnings management has led to a global 
trend in corporate governance reform to increase outside board representation (Weisbach, 1988). In 
response to a series of major financial reporting scandals, in 2002, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) proposed a new corporate governance 
regulation requiring listed firms to have a majority of independent directors on the board. In essence, a 
director is independent if that director does not receive any significant compensatory fee from the firm 
other than the director fee and is not an affiliated person of the firm or any of its subsidiary. Firms that 
did not comply with this rule before the reform were required to increase their board independence. One 
of the primary objectives of this reform was to enhance the monitoring by the board, particularly the 
monitoring of financial reporting.  
Also in 2002, U.S. Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) which sets numerous new or amended 
requirements for all public companies and accounting firms in the U.S. The 66-page Act is arguably the 
most important amendment in the U.S. Securities Law, aimed at bringing transparency to the stock 
market. The main objective of this law is to protect the interests of investors by forcing public companies 
to ensure greater transparency of their reports and financial information. At the same time, the law also 
adds provisions binding the personal responsibility of executives and chief financial officers for the 
reliability of financial statements. Besides, public companies are required to make changes in internal 
control, especially accounting control.  
A decade earlier, a major governance reform also happened in the U.K. In 1992, the “Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance" chaired by Adrian Cadbury published the Cadbury Report 
which included a Code of Best Practices that provide recommendations on the composition of the board 
of directors. While the Code does not explicitly advise a certain number of non-executive board members, 
the recommendation that audit committees should comprise exclusively of non-executive directors and 
should include at least three members means that firms should have a minimum of three non-executive 
directors on the board. Although not having the force of law, the Cadbury Report (1992) was adopted as 
part of the listing requirement by the London Stock Exchange. 
Emerging markets also follow the global trend in the reform of the board of directors. In early 2001, 
following major earnings management scandals and other financial frauds11, the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC)  and the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges introduced new 
guidelines that prescribed the adoption of independent directors for listed companies in China. The 
                                                          
11 According to Lai (2011), “the practice of earnings management is both extensive and extreme”. In 2001, the State 
Auditing Bureau found that more than two-thirds of 1,290 largest state-owned companies falsified their accounts, 
with the illegal money exceeding 100,000,000,000 Chinese Yuan. Other scandals of fraud include the prominent case 
of China Life insurance company, in which $652 million in financial irregularities was uncovered in December 2003. 
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adoption of these guidelines was voluntary. However, because only a small number of firms followed 
these guidelines, a new regulation called “Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board 
of Directors in Listed Companies” was issued by CSRC in August 2001. This regulation mandates that all 
firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges must have at least two independent directors 
by June 2002 and one-third of the board must be independent by June 2003. 
In 2000, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was issued and one important recommendation 
of this Code is that independent directors should make up at least one-third of the board. In 2012, this 
recommendation was upgraded and requires that the board had to include a majority of independent 
directors if the Board Chairman is not an independent director. However, in 2017, after the update by the 
Securities Commission Malaysia, this recommendation applies to all listed companies no matter the Board 
Chairman is independent or not.  
In February 2002, the GreTai Securities Market in Taiwan added a set of new requirements to their listing 
rules, requiring companies to have at least two independent directors on the Board of Directors and one 
independent supervisor on the Supervisory Board to meet the listing requirement. Accompanying this, a 
corporate governance document, “Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles”, was issued in October 
2002. The independent director system is one of the main subjects in the Principles, recommending listed 
companies to hire an appropriate number of independent directors. The Principles include provisions to 
guide independent directors and supervisors in performing their jobs and separate the compensation 
plans of these directors and supervisors from those of others. As neither the listing rule nor the Principles 
have the status of law, regulators later attempted to make the independent director system regulatory 
binding. In December 2005, an amendment to Taiwan’s Securities and Exchange Act was approved, stating 
that publicly listed companies are required to appoint two or more independent directors. 
Empirical evidence 
Several studies show that in the period following a change in corporate governance regulations, earnings 
management reduces. For example, in the U.S., earnings management had increased steadily since 1987 
but then declined after the passage of SOX in 2002 (Cohen et al., 2008). Lobo & Zhou (2009) found that 
Canadian firms listed in the U.S. and subject to SOX are more conservative in financial reporting in the 
post-SOX period. Interestingly, such impact is not homogeneous: it is more pronounced for firms that 
were aggressive in the pre-SOX period. Similarly, using a balanced sample of UK-incorporated quoted 
companies to examine the effectiveness of the Cadbury Report issued in 1992, Peasnell et al. (2000) found 
less income-increasing accrual management when the proportion of non-executive directors is high in the 
post-Cadbury period. Altogether, these results are consistent with the view that appropriately structured 
boards discharge their financial reporting duties more effectively after corporate governance reform. 
However, such effectiveness is not evident under all circumstances. Following the listing requirement of 
NYSE and NADS, Chen et al. (2015) find that non-compliant firms (i.e. firms that did not have a majority of 
independent directors before the reforms) with low information acquisition costs experience a significant 
reduction in earnings management after the reform. However, this effect does not hold for all non-
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compliant firms on average. These results indicate that the effectiveness of board monitoring relies on 
not only independence but also information cost. Therefore, a poor information environment can hamper 
independent directors’ monitoring, making them ineffective in reducing earnings management. 
The establishment of mandatory regulations does not always produce favorable outcomes. Studying the 
impact of corporate governance reform in China, Lai (2011) shows that board independence significantly 
reduces earnings management when the adoption of independent directors is voluntary following non-
binding guidelines. However, this effect is insignificant when such adoption is made mandatory by law. 
Lai (2011) explains that the mandatory requirement of quantities merely brings about a “flight from 
quality” (p.27). The law creates high pressure on the premature market of Chinese independent directors 
and the market supply could not catch up with the sudden increase in demand. Although most firms 
manage to have sufficient independent directors as required, this does not mean that they are effective 
directors: there is no significant association between board independence and earnings management in 
the post-reform period. This suggests that board independence could be an effective mechanism to 
control earnings management, but a hasty and drastic reform could distort the market’s demand and 
supply conditions which render such governance mechanism ineffective. Therefore, without the 
development of a complementary market for independent directors, a board reform that puts too 
stringent requirements on businesses could prove futile.  
Chen & Zhang (2014) conducted a study on 447 Chinese listed firms from 2000 – 2006 and report that the 
magnitude of earnings management measured by discretionary accruals decreases considerably after the 
introduction of the Chinese Corporate Governance Code in 2002 which requires more independent 
directors on the board. However, although statistically significant for private firms, such impact is minimal 
when listed firms are State-controlling. Chen & Zhang (2014) explain that to obtain more cashback from 
listed companies, controlling shareholders have strong incentives to mislead minority shareholders about 
the firm’s economic performance by inflating reported earnings. When the State is a large shareholder, 
they have even more power to influence the board and deprive the benefits of minority shareholders.  
Turning to Malaysia, after the corporate governance reform, Germain et al. (2014) document a significant 
increase in the number of independent directors from 2002 to 2007. Independent directors made up more 
than one-third of the board proportion as required. In contrast, the number of non-independent directors 
declines gradually over the studied period. However, market-to-book ratios and stock returns are 
negatively related to board independence. A possible explanation for this finding is that too many 
independent directors could impose a harmful constraint on managers. Demsetz (1983) maintains that 
besides independent directors, executive compensation contracts the pressures from the capital market 
already provide adequate monitoring of managers.  
Examining the impact of board independence reform in Taiwan, Liu & Yang (2008) report that 58.4% of 
newly appointed independent directors and supervisors were old faces. These independent directors 
were already sitting on the board and their status was changed simply by adding the word “independent” 
to the original title. Before the enforcement of the Listing Rules in Taiwan, there were no such titles as 
“independent directors” and “independent supervisor”. Consequently, it is natural to change their titles. 
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However, it could also be that these directors and supervisors were friends and associates of the 
controlling shareholders who ran the companies. They happened to meet the independence requirement 
and therefore were conveniently reappointed to become independent directors and supervisors. If this is 
the case, the purpose of the Listing Rules to enable board independency is defeated.  
In summary, corporate governance reform has been occurring in many countries around the world. 
However, empirical evidence shows that this is not a one-fit-all solution for every country. Corporate 
governance reform depends on the institutional context. For most countries, a successful reform requires 
radical changes in the legal system such as amendments in accompanying laws (i.e. securities, company, 
and bankruptcy law) and enforcement strengthening (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
2000). Without these additional factors, the effectiveness of corporate governance reform should not be 
automatically assumed.  
2.4.3 Other corporate governance mechanisms 
Besides board independence, other board characteristics should be taken into account to strengthen 
corporate governance and reduce earnings management. According to the agency theory, the principal-
agent problem would be worse if the CEO also takes the leading role of the board – a situation regarded 
as “CEO grading his homework” (Brickley et al., 1997, p.190). Klein (2002) finds that earnings management 
in terms of abnormal accruals is positively related to CEO duality. In contrast, when the CEO is not the 
Board Chairman, other directors are more inclined to perform an independent role. Regarding the gender 
of directors, according to the resource dependence theory, due to their different life experiences, female 
directors contribute diverse perspectives to the boardroom and help to improve the quality of board 
decisions, especially for complex issues (Huse & Grethe Solberg, 2006). A board with gender diversity are 
better at monitoring managers as women directors tend to require more audit efforts and managerial 
accountability (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Turning to board size, a large number of directors can bring 
multiple resources to the firms. However, as board size increases, it will be more difficult to coordinate, 
align interests, and reach consensus on important decisions (O’Reilly et al., 1989). Jensen (1993) suggests 
that larger boards produce less candid discussions of managerial performance and reduce the board joint 
power in resisting CEO dominance. Similarly, external auditors from reputed auditing firms are more likely 
to detect and mitigate earnings management due to their extensive qualifications and experience in the 
field (Rusmin, 2010). Rusmin (2010) examine listed companies in Singapore and conclude that the 
magnitude of earnings management is significantly lower amongst firms employing a Big 4 auditor. 
Regarding the above arguments, separating the role of CEO and Board Chairman, appointing female 
directors, maintaining a smaller board size, and hiring reputed external auditor may help to reduce 
earnings management.  
Another mechanism is firm ownership structure. Minority shareholders have little motivation to commit 
to monitoring the firm and simply free ride on larger shareholders. Therefore, firms with more dispersed 
ownership tend to underperform firms with more concentrated ownership. However, according to the 
agency theory, although major shareholders contribute to effective monitoring and help firms to drive 
performance, they may abuse their power and gain private benefits at the costs of smaller shareholders. 
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The principal-principal problem might worsen when the majority of shareholders are also inside 
managers. Manager’s entrenchment is often found in companies with high managerial ownership (Sáenz 
González & García-Meca, 2014). Therefore, outsiders, especially foreign investors may be helpful in 
monitoring firms. Foreign shareholders potentially help to transfer resources and good corporate 
governance practices from developed markets to emerging markets. In contrast, domestic investors are 
assumed to be inferior in performing a monitoring role as they often have complex business relationships 
with the firm and other domestic shareholders (Douma et al., 2006). Perhaps among domestic investors, 
the State is an important player. Heath & Norman (2004) argue that State-owned companies tend to 
underperform their counterparts. Managers in State-owned companies have less motivation to drive a 
superior performance as these companies possibly enjoy bailout from the state in case of default. Overall, 
extant literature suggests that higher concentrated and foreign ownership, but lower managerial and 
State ownership may reduce earnings management. Based on this, firms may design an appropriate 
ownership structure to constraint the opportunistic behavior of managers. 
 
2.5 The Vietnamese context 
2.5.1 Internal governance structure of Vietnamese listed companies 
Vietnamese listed companies typically have a two-tier internal governance structure including the Board 
of Directors and the Supervisory Board. The Board of Directors must have at least five and at most eleven 
members as stipulated by law. Directors are responsible for monitoring managers and participating in 
important decisions of the company on behalf of all shareholders. In Vietnam, listed firms are not obliged 
to establish a separate sub-committee to support the Board of Directors with monitoring tasks. Very few 
companies in Vietnam appoint a separate Audit Committee or Compensation Committee. Instead, each 
member of the Board can be appointed to take charge of each issue such as compensation or internal 
control. Taking the role of a multi-component committee, the Board of Directors is the main mechanism 
to monitor managers. 
On the other hand, the Board of Directors is monitored by the Supervisory Board and this two-tier internal 
governance structure differs from that in the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon countries where there is no 
Supervisory Board. Specifically, the Supervisory Board comprises at least three members and at most five 
members. The Head of the Supervisory Board must be a person who has expertise in accounting and at 
least one member must be an accountant or auditor. All members must not work in the accounting and 
finance department of the company and they must not work for the company’s external auditor.  
These two boards have distinct authorities and their composition cannot be mixed, i.e. members of the 
Board of Directors cannot sit on the Supervisory Board and vice-versa. My study focuses more on the 
Board of Directors as it is the direct mechanism that monitors executive managers. They meet more often 
and involve closer in daily business operations compared to the Supervisory Board. For simplicity, the 
Board of Directors is mainly referred to as “the board” and the Board of Management and the Supervisory 
Board will be referred to by their full names throughout my study. 
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Figure 1: Two-tier internal governance structure of Vietnamese listed companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5.2 Transition of a post-war economy 
The economic and social development of Vietnam has been remarkable, recalling that the country has 
only been independent for 45 years since the Vietnam war ended in 1975. Between 1986 and 2019, the 
total annual export turnover increased from USD 789 million to USD 264 billion (General Statistics Office 
Of Vietnam, 2020). This significant export growth can be attributed to Vietnam’s membership in large 
trade organizations as well as various bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Agreements. From 1980 to 
2018, poverty rates declined sharply from over 70% to below 6% (World Bank, 2019), per capita income 
increased from USD 100 to USD 2500 (United Nations, 2019), and the percentage of people aged 15 and 
older who can read and write went up from 80% to 95% (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2019).  
Vietnam also pays close attention to globalization. The first globalization milestone of Vietnam was in 
1995 when the country became a full member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Five 
years later, Vietnam signed a bilateral trade agreement with the U.S., creating strong momentum for 
investment and export growth. In 2007, Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) which 
granted Vietnamese exporters access to developed markets. Currently, Vietnam has signed 13 bilateral 
and multilateral Free Trade Agreements. The most recent one is the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement 
in 2020 which paves tariff reduction on 99% of Vietnamese goods exported to 28 EU-member countries. 
The orientation of this strong economic development and global integration dated back to the first large 
scale economic reform in 1986 when Vietnam establishes the “Renovation Policy” (“Chính sách Đổi Mới”) 
to transform the centrally-planned economy (also known as a command economy) where privately-run 
businesses were almost non-existent (Nguyen et al., 2014). 12 Accordingly, the government withdrew from 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and converted them into joint-stock companies. The number of full SOEs 
                                                          
12 A centrally planned economy is an economic system in which a central authority, typically the government, makes 
top-down economic decisions regarding the manufacturing and the distribution of products. State-owned 
enterprises are in charge of producing goods and services and bureaucrats control the prices. In contrast, in a market 
economy, production and prices are determined bottom up by businesses and consumers (market forces).  
Shareholders 
Supervisory Board 
Board of Directors 
Board of Management 
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in Vietnam reduced from more than 12,000 in 1990 to 5,655 in 2001 and further to 718 in 2016 
(Government Information Portal, 2019). The establishment of two stock exchanges, HOSE and HNX, largely 
supported this strategy (Vu et al., 2018).  
However, the ownership structure of these firms, many of which are listed, is still heavily concentrated in 
the hands of the State. This is the reason why this process is named equitization (or partial privatization), 
not full privatization. Hoang et al., (2017) report that the average State ownership in 150 Vietnamese 
listed firms is 27.6% and the highest State ownership is 79.1%. Enterprises in special industries such as 
defense, public services, transportation, oil and gas, electricity, and telecommunication will remain fully 
owned by the State. Instead of having government bureaucrats directly supervising SOEs as before, the 
State now exercises its rights as a large shareholder by appointing representative directors to the board 
(Duong et al., 2017). The special nature of the equitization process in Vietnam seems to be contrasting to 
common practices around the world where the State typically retreat to only their regulatory roles after 
privatization. This reality in Vietnam, a one-party state, reflects the socio-political objective that the 
Vietnamese government has been pursuing: constructing a market economy without deviating from a 
socialist orientation in the long-term (Nguyen et al., 2014). 
The special orientation of the economy has several impacts on the stock market. Listing on the Vietnamese 
stock exchanges was meager and often associated with conservatism (Nguyen et al., 2014). Equitized SOEs 
have been the main suppliers of stock, but subjecting these firms to market practices is difficult when the 
State is still their major shareholder. At the same time, the continuous development of the private sector 
requires strong capital support from the stock market. A stock market may achieve its expected roles 
when there is fair competition between companies according to market forces which improve operational 
efficiency (Draho, 2004 as cited by Nguyen et al., 2014). However, the underdevelopment and short 
history of Vietnamese private companies suggest that they have limited capability in competing against 
SOEs. In fact, despite open listing for all companies, the capital of small private enterprises were mainly 
from the founders or their families (Vu et al., 2018). Therefore, building a stock market that can ensure 
efficiency and sustainability remains an ongoing challenge for Vietnamese policymakers. 
2.5.3 Corporate governance reform in Vietnam 
The rapid economic development and global integration, the State dominance, and the semi-efficient 
stock market call for a strong corporate governance framework to ensure transparency, supervision, and 
proper management in the market (Vu et al., 2018). However, whether corporate governance 
development has been in alignment with market development is still a question of practice.  
From 2000 to 2005, there was no specific law addressing listed firms on HOSE and HNX and these firms 
were mainly governed by the Enterprise Law issued in 1999 (revised in 2005). Although listed companies 
have many unique characteristics, the Enterprise Law does not differentiate them from other types of 
companies. It was not until June 2006 that the National Assembly issued the first Law on Securities. 
However, this law mainly guided the trading of stocks on the two exchanges and corporate governance 
was not one of its focuses.  
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It should be noted that the Vietnamese stock exchanges are responsible for issuing listing and delisting 
rules. However, regulations on corporate governance shall be issued by higher authorities such as the 
Ministry of Finance or the National Assembly. Besides, voluntary code was not a common practice during 
this early stage of market development when corporate governance is still a new concept. For an emerging 
market with weak legal enforcement like that of Vietnam, voluntary efforts often fail to bring about 
improvements (Tran & Holloway, 2014). Therefore, governmental bodies were the main force that set up 
a corporate governance framework via mandatory law. 
In March 2007 the first Corporate Governance Code for Vietnamese listed firms was issued by the Ministry 
of Finance with Decision 12/2007/QD-BTC. This was the first document that thoroughly covered important 
aspects of corporate governance of listed companies such as shareholder protection, conflict of interests, 
information disclosure, the Board of Directors, and the Supervisory Board. However, the force of law of 
this regulation is semi-mandatory, meaning that if firms fail to comply with the rules but manage to report 
their non-compliance to shareholders and the State Securities Commission, they will not be punished. 
Overall, from 2006 to 2007, the government had taken initial efforts in setting up a corporate governance 
framework for listed firms in Vietnam through the issuance of several laws and regulations. However, they 
bear common criticisms such as (i) gaps in documents and enforcement; (ii) vague definitions and 
overlapping regulations; and (iii) late issuance (Vu et al., 2018). The Vietnamese regulatory system follows 
Code Law which is typically regarded as less well-defined than Common Law (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). 
Vietnamese laws, rules, and regulations in effect were not clear enough to provide guidance and direction 
for public companies (Freeman & Nguyen, 2006). For example, although the majority of firms have a clear 
organizational structure comprising of a Board of Directors, a Supervisory Board, a Chief Executive Officer, 
and Functional Managers, regulations do not clearly define their responsibilities (Vu et al., 2018). 
Vietnamese corporate governance is still in its early stage and has “low minority protection and low rule 
of law” (World Bank, 2006; World Bank, 2012). Besides, the implementation and enforcement of the 
regulations are not effective (Freeman and Nguyen, 2006). Companies whose State ownership is high may 
enjoy sanction in case of failure (Vu et al., 2018). Therefore, it is uncommon to observe an incompetent 
director being fired or punished for bad decisions.  
These limitations lead to several major scandals and bankruptcies of many listed companies such as the 
delisting of Bach Tuyet Cotton Company13 in 2009, the “Vinashin scandal” in 2010, and the bankruptcy of 
Vien Dong Pharmacy Company14 in 2011. The reasons for these failures were attributed to rapid 
expansion, financial crisis, weak corporate governance, and weak expertise of the Board of Directors 
                                                          
13 Listed on HOSE in 2004, Bach Tuyet Cotton Company (BBT) is the market leader in the medical cotton products. In 
2005, BBT made a huge investment in its women's sanitary napkin business but could not compete with foreign 
competitors. Having to pay huge principal and interest to the bank, BBT to have a net income loss continuously from 
2006 - 2007, even stopped working from July 2008 and its stock was delisted in August 2009. 
14 Vien Dong Pharmacy Company (DVD) was listed on HOSE in 2009 and looked very promising with ROE of 60.5%. 
However, in August 2011, HOSE suddenly announced that DVD would file for bankruptcy and its stock would be 
delisted. The CEO was arrested for allegation against creating fake transactions to manipulate stock prices. 
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(Nguyen et al., 2019; Vu et al., 2018). It was no surprise that the Corporate Governance Scorecard 
published in 2012 by the IFC revealed a downward trend in corporate governance scores of Vietnamese 
listed firms, decreasing from 43.9 in 2009 to 42.5 in 2011 and these scores are lower than most other 
ASEAN countries. Therefore, implementing new laws, granting enhanced powers to the regulatory 
agencies, and strengthening enforcement remain the three key challenges in corporate governance for 
Vietnam (Connelly et al., 2017). 
However, Vietnam has taken steps to improve its corporate governance practices. The year 2012 
witnessed an important change in corporate governance regulations with the establishment of Circular 
121. The Circular amend current regulations on several aspects such as the Board of Directors, the 
Supervisory Board, and shareholder protection. However, the most important change is the “1/3 rule”, 
requiring one-third of the board of directors in public non-listed15 companies to be non-executive. For 
public listed companies, a stricter regulation applies: at least one-third of the board must be independent.  
International corporate governance best practices often divide categories of directors into three types 
(though not necessarily mutually exclusive) that are executive, non-executive, and independent based on 
their responsibilities and relations to the company. In Vietnam, there was no clear distinction for these 
definitions and Circular 121 was the first legal document to define them: 
 Non-executive director:  
i. Not a member of the company’s Board of Management (i.e., not a CEO, Deputy CEO, or 
Chief Accountant of the company); 
 Independent director:  
i. Not a member of the company’s Board of Management; not related to a member of the 
company’s Board of Management 
ii. Not a member of the Board of Management of associated companies (i.e. subsidiaries, 
parent company, and sister companies); 
iii. Not a major shareholder of the company; not a representative or a related person of a 
major shareholder of the company; 
iv. Not working at organizations that provide legal advice or auditing services for the 
company in the last two years; 
v. Not a partner or a relative of a partner of the company with an annual transaction value 
of at least 30% of the company’s total revenue or the total value of purchased goods and 
services in the last two years. 
At the same time, the Circular provided shareholders more flexibility in electing the board of directors. 
Particularly, the Circular removed the specific number of directors that shareholders are allowed to elect 
                                                          
15 According the the Securities Law 2006, Article 25, section 1: public companies are joint-stock companies of one of 
the following three types: (i) The company has offered its shares to the public but not yet listed; (ii) The company 
has stocks listed at the Stock Exchange or the Securities Trading Center; (iii) The company has shares owned by at 
least 100 shareholders, excluding professional securities investors and has a charter capital of at least VND 10 billion. 
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based on their shareholding percentage. 16 Unlike Decision 12, Circular 121 is fully mandatory and firms 
would be fined if they fail to comply with any rule regardless if they report their non-compliance or not. 
The amount of fine for non-complying firms also increases. Bringing important changes in corporate 
governance regulations, Circular 121 is the focus of my study. 
It should be noted that Circular 121 was then replaced in 2017 by Decree 71/2017/ND-CP with higher 
regulatory validity. 17 This decree maintains the “1/3 rule” of independent directors but the condition 
applied to independent directors is stricter: they must not hold more than 1% of the shares in the 
company, compared to 5% as previously mandated by Circular 121. Besides, Decree 71 also stipulates that 
from Aug 1st, 2020, the CEO of a listed company is not allowed to concurrently be the Board Chairman.  
With the support of international institutions such as OECD, World Bank, and IFC, Vietnam also adopts 
international best practices in corporate governance. The draft of the revised Enterprise Law in 2014 
included many of the recommendations in the baseline report of World Bank (2006) (Connelly et al., 
2017). In August 2019, with technical support from IFC and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs, the State Securities Commission of Vietnam introduced a voluntary Corporate Governance Best 
Practices for public firms. Unlike the Corporate Governance Code, these are non-binding 
recommendations, and adoption by listed firms is voluntary. It includes standards that go beyond the 
minimum legal requirements, encouraging companies to move towards international best practices. Out 
of ten principles with detailed recommendations included, six principles focus on the responsibilities of 
the board of directors. The remaining four principles cover areas such as control environment, 
transparency and disclosure, shareholder rights, and stakeholder relations.  
Through 15 years of reform starting from 2007, Vietnamese corporate governance has achieved positive 
results. OECD (2018) acknowledge that the improvement in Vietnamese regulations has improved 
information flow and allow investors to participate in the decisions of companies. Starting as one of the 
lowest-ranked countries for protecting investors in the world, Vietnam has significantly improved its 
Investor Protection Index from 2.0 points in 2007 to 5.3  in 2017 (out of a maximum score of 10) and these 
scores were close to the world median of 5.7 (World Bank, 2018).  
 
                                                          
16 Decision 12/2007/QĐ-BTC: A shareholder or group of shareholders holding less than 10% of the voting shares for 
at least six consecutive months may nominate one (01) member; from 10% to less than 30% may nominate two (02) 
members; from 30% to less than 50% may nominate three (03) members; from 50% to less than 65% may nominate 
four (04) members and if 65% or more, nominate all members. 
Circular 121/2012/TT-BTC: The shareholders holding voting shares for a continuous period of at least six (06) months 
up to the time of closing the list of attending shareholders have the right to include the number of voting rights to 
nominate candidates for the Board of Directors. The nomination of the candidate for the Board of Directors that the 
shareholders after voting the voting rights must comply with the provisions of law and the company's charter. 
17 Decree 71 was issued by the National Government while Circular 121 was issued by the Ministry of Finance. 
Regulatory validity of Vietnamese regulations in descending order: Constitution – Law – Resolution – Decree – 
Circular – Decision.  
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Table 1: Timeline of corporate governance development in Vietnam 
Year Event Issuer Compliance 
1999 Issuance of the Enterprise Law National Assembly Mandatory 
2005 Revision of the Enterprise Law National Assembly Mandatory 
2006 Issuance of the Securities Law  National Assembly Mandatory 
2007 Issuance of the first Corporate Governance Code for 
Vietnamese listed companies (Decision 12/2007/QD-BTC) 
Ministry of Finance Semi-
mandatory 
2010 Revision of the Securities Law National Assembly Mandatory 
2012 Revision of the Corporate Governance Code (Circular 
121/2012/TT-BTC, replacing Decision 12/2007/QD-BTC) 
Ministry of Finance Mandatory 
2014 Revision of the Enterprise Law National Assembly Mandatory 
2017 Revision of the Corporate Governance Code (Decree 
71/2017/ND-CP, replacing Circular 121/2012/TT-BTC) 
Ministry of Finance Mandatory 
2019 Issuance of the Corporate Governance Best Practice for 
public (listed and non-listed) companies 
State Securities 
Commission 
Voluntary 
 
2.6 Hypothesis development 
The relationship between earnings management and board independence 
According to agency theorists, independent directors can effectively perform agency-related tasks such 
as appointing, compensating, monitoring, and firing executive managers. While benefits of earnings 
management accrue primarily to executive directors (Weisbach, 1988), independent directors face 
significant costs from earnings management such as the loss of reputation as effective monitors (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988). The associated costs are predicted to provide independent directors with 
good incentives to ensure reliable earnings reporting. Therefore, outside directors help to reduce the 
principal-agent problem. Independent directors, as opposed to executive directors, have fewer 
connections with major shareholders and thus, are more likely to ensure fair treatment towards minority 
shareholders (Kim et al., 2007). Outside directors also play an important role in minimizing the principal-
principal problem.  
Under the resource dependence theory, independent directors may bring diversified expertise to the 
board. Peasnell et al. (2000) suggest that non-executives directors often hold senior management 
positions in other large firms and thus, they have the necessary skills to monitor managers. Many of them 
also have expertise in finance and accounting. For example, Nguyen et al. (2017) find that 41% of 
independent directors in Vietnam specializing in accounting. Due to their experience and qualifications, 
independent directors are familiar with financial reporting issues and can identify misreporting cases. 
Thus, it is expected that a more independent board helps to reduce earnings management. 
In alignment with the stakeholder theory and the stewardship theory, independent directors have 
incentives to develop their reputation as experts in decision control and are more concerned about their 
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image in the eyes of other stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, they are motivated to ensure 
the effective monitoring of the company and be a steward of the company. Serving as directors of well-
run companies signals their competence and prestige to the job market. Consequently, outside directors 
are assumed to be less influenced by management and therefore, discharge a better monitoring role 
compared to executive directors. 
As independent directors can effectively oversee managers in the reporting process, it is expected that 
earnings management is mitigated by the inclusion of independent directors on the board. This view is 
supported by various studies (i.e. Ali & Zhang, 2015; Dechow et al., 1996; Peasnell et al. 2000). Based on 
the theories discussed and the empirical evidence, the first hypothesis of this study is formulated as 
follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Board independence reduces accrual earnings management among Vietnamese listed 
firms. 
The impact of regulatory reform on board independence and earnings management 
Circular 121 may not have a direct impact on earnings management because improving financial reporting 
is not at the heart of Circular 121. However, Circular 121 may have a moderating impact on earnings 
management via board independence. The circular imposes stricter regulations on board independence 
and it provides a benchmark for investors to evaluate a firm’s governance practices. Therefore, firms that 
do not comply with the “1/3 rule” are forced to hire more independent directors. Eventually, firms 
establish a clearer separation in management and control by increasing board independence which in 
turn, reduces earnings management.  
This proposition is supported by a number of other studies. For example, using a balanced sample of 
English companies to examine the effectiveness of the Cadbury Report issued in 1992, Peasnell et al. 
(2000) found less income-increasing accruals when the proportion of outside directors is high in the post-
Cadbury period. Chen & Zhang (2014) conducted a study on 447 Chinese listed firms from 2000–2006 and 
report that the magnitude of earnings management measured by discretionary accruals decreased 
considerably after the introduction of the Chinese Corporate Governance Code in 2002 which mandates 
more independent directors on the board. 
All else equal, if Circular 121 has helped to increase board independence and thereby, improve board 
effectiveness in monitoring managers, one might expect the relationship between board independence 
and earnings management to be more pronounced after the Circular came into effect. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis of this study is formulated as follow: 
Hypothesis 2: The negative relationship between board independence and accrual earnings 
management among Vietnamese listed firms is more pronounced in the post-Circular period. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Testing methodology 
3.1.1 Regression analysis 
Studies that investigate the relationship between earnings management and board independence 
commonly use linear regression analysis (i.e. Klein, 2002; Osma & Noguer, 2007; Peasnell et al., 2005; 
Sarkar et al., 2008; Ye, 2014). To examine the moderating effect of corporate governance reform on this 
relationship, regression analysis is also the most popular approach. Researchers typically use a dummy 
variable that represents the reform period and interact this variable with the independent variable of 
interest. For example, Peasnell et al. (2000) use the interaction term between the proportion of non-
executive directors and the dummy variable representing the post-Cadbury period and regress it against 
abnormal accruals. Other studies with a similar approach include those of Chen & Zhang (2014); Cohen et 
al. (2007); Lobo & Zhou (2009). Consistent with previous research, I also use linear regression analysis in 
my study.  
There are different linear regression approaches for panel data. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is one of the 
most used approaches in studying board independence, earnings management, and corporate 
governance reform (i.e. Chen & Zhang, 2014; Cohen et al., 2007; Lobo & Zhou, 2009; Peasnell et al., 2000). 
A firm’s individual characteristics (or individual effects) typically exist within a panel data design. For 
instance, the business practices of a company may influence its choice of directors which then influence 
earnings management. A failure to include these effects may bias the results (Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
Therefore, to account for the heterogeneity among observations, industry and year fixed effects are 
usually included (i.e. Chen et al., 2011; Chen & Zhang, 2014).  
Besides OLS, the fixed-effect model (FEM) and random-effect model (REM) are also used by several 
studies in corporate governance (i.e. Bai et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2007). Because FEM and REM take into 
account unique effects at the firm level, it is unnecessary to control for unobserved industry effects or 
year effects like in OLS. It should be noted that FEM and REM are largely different in their assumptions. 
FEM assumes that individual effects are correlated with the independent variables while REM assumes 
that such individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the independent variables (Schmidheiny, 2019). 
In other words, FEM controls for all time-invariant unobserved variables, whereas REM can estimate only 
those that are explicitly introduced to the model.  
To check for the existence of random effects, the Breusch – Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test can be used 
(Baltagi, 2013). The null hypothesis of this test is that the variance of errors is dependent on the predictor 
variables. If the null hypothesis is rejected, there is evidence of random effects. To check for the presence 
of fixed effects within the data, the F-test can be used (Baltagi, 2013). The null hypothesis of this test is 
that parameters of fixed effects are jointly zero, implying that there is no individual variation or unique 
characteristics among firms. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we can conclude that there are fixed effects 
in the model. A model may have both fixed and random effects. In this case, the Hausman test can be 
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used to decide whether FEM or REM is more suitable (Hsiao, 2014). The null hypothesis of this test is that 
unique errors are not correlated with the predictor variables and thus, REM is the preferred model. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, then FEM should be used instead. 
Consistent with previous studies, I will use the OLS model with industry and year fixed effects. Besides, I 
also use FEM and REM to cross-check the results of OLS.  
3.1.2 Collinearity and multicollinearity test 
Collinearity is a situation in which two independent variables in multiple regression are highly correlated. 
For example, board size and board independence may be highly correlated because larger boards tend to 
have more independent directors. Even if collinearity does not directly reduce the model’s statistical 
power, it complicates the interpretation of results because of interrelationships among variables (Hair, 
2014). The most popular way to identify collinearity is to construct a correlation matrix. The presence of 
high correlations is the first indication of substantial collinearity. As a rule of thumb, a coefficient above 
0.5 indicates considerable correlation (Hair, 2014).  
However, low correlation coefficients do not ensure a lack of multicollinearity, which is defined as a 
correlation among three or more variables. Although panel data is rarely plagued with multicollinearity 
(Baltagi, 2013), I still check for the degree of multicollinearity in my model using the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF). VIF is the inverse of tolerance value which is defined as the amount of variability of the 
selected independent variable not explained by the other independent variables. This means that a large 
VIF value is evidence of high multicollinearity among predictor variables. It is suggested that a VIF value 
above 3 indicates substantial multicollinearity (Hair, 2014). According to York (2012), there are two 
solutions in case of multicollinearity besides dropping variables. The first approach is to simply estimate 
the model like any other model but then discount its statistical significance. The second approach is to 
somehow combine the set of collinear variables and use a single combined variable. 
 
3.2 Model specification 
To test the hypothesis, I use earnings management which is measured by abnormal accruals (discretionary 
accruals) as the dependent variable. The main independent variables are board independence and its 
interaction term with a dummy variable representing the reform period. Several other control variables 
are also included. This model is similar to that of Peasnell et al., (2000) and Chen & Zhang (2014). 
𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑔𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡  +
        𝛽𝑓 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + ɛ𝑖𝑡   
GOVERNANCE and FIRM_CHARACTERISTICS are two groups of control variables. Please refer to Table 2 
below for more details of the variables in this model. 
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Table 2: Summary of variable definition 
Variable Definition References Predicted 
Sign 
Dependent variable 
Earnings management 
(AbsDA) 
The absolute value of discretionary 
(abnormal) accruals 
Dechow et al., 1995;  Dechow & Dichev, 
2002; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 2005 
 
Indepdendent variables 
Board independent 
(IND) 
Percentage of independent directors on 
the Board of Directors.  
Chen & Zhang, 2014; Peasnell et al., 2000 - 
Post-Circular 121 
(REFORM) 
Dummy variable: 1 if the year is from 2013 
– 2016, 0 otherwise. 
Chen & Zhang, 2014; Cohen et al., 2007; 
Lobo & Zhou, 2009; Peasnell et al., 2000 
- 
Control variables –  GOVERNANCE 
CEO duality 
(DUAL) 
Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO is also the 
Board Chairman, 0 otherwise 
Klein, 2002; Lo et al., 2010 + 
Board size 
(BOARD_SIZE) 
Total number of directors on the Board of 
Directors. 
Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Xie et al., 2003 - 
Female director 
(WOMEN) 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is at least one 
woman on the Board of Directors, 0 
otherwise 
Arun et al., 2015; Gavious et al., 2012 - 
Ownership 
concentration 
(OWN_CON) 
Percentage of stocks held by all large 
shareholders, i.e. those whose ownership 
is at least 5%. 
Bozec, 2008; Sáenz González & García-
Meca, 2014 
- 
Managerial ownership 
(OWN_MNG) 
Percentage of stocks held by the Board of 
Management 
Wang & Yung, 2011; Yang et al., 2008 ? 
Foreign ownership 
(OWN_FOR) 
Percentage of stocks held by foreign 
investors 
Guo et al., 2015; Kim & Yoon, 2008 -  
State ownership 
(OWN_STATE) 
Percentage of stocks held by the State Chen & Zhang, 2014; Hoang et al., 2017 + 
Big4 external auditor 
(BIG4) 
Dummy variable: 1 if a firm is audited by a 
Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise. 
Becker et al., 1998; Rusmin, 2010 - 
Control variables – FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
Firm size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of a company's total 
assets 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kinney & 
McDaniel, 1989 
- 
Leverage (LEV) Long-term debt divided by total assets DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990 
 
+ 
Growth (GROWTH_A) The percentage of change of this year 
assets compared to last year assets 
Ali and Zhang, 2015; (Yu, 2008) + 
Firm performance (ROA) Operating income (EBIT) divided by total 
assets 
Dechow et al., 1995; Lee et al., 2006 - 
Operating cash flow 
(OCF) 
Operating income before depreciation 
minus working capital divided by lagged 
total assets. Working capital is current 
assets minus current liabilities 
Lobo & Zhou, 2009; Peasnell et al., 2000 - 
INDUSTRY Industry dummies Chen et al., 2011; Chen & Zhang, 2014  
YEAR Year dummies Chen et al., 2011; Chen & Zhang, 2014  
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3.3 Dependent variable 
3.3.1 Jones model 
The dependent variable in this study is earnings management. Jones (1991) measures earnings 
management using total accrual which is defined as a function of revenue growth, and property, plant, 
and equipment (PPE). Total accruals are then decomposed into discretionary (abnormal) and non-
discretionary (normal) accruals. While non-discretionary accruals reflect truthful adjustments that are 
related to firms’ business conditions, discretionary accruals capture distortions from the manipulation of 
the accounting principles (Dechow & Ge, 2006).18 Therefore, a higher level of discretionary accruals is an 
indication of earnings management.  
In the Jones model, earnings management can be calculated with four steps: 
 Step 1: Calculate total accruals for each firm-year observation. Total accruals are the change in non-
cash working capital before income taxes payable less total depreciation expense. The change in non-
cash working capital before taxes is defined as the change in current assets other than cash and short-
term investments less current liabilities other than current maturities of long-term liabilities: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  − (∆𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡− ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡) − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 
 Step 2: Regress total accruals against sales growth and PPE separately for each year and industry using 
cross-sectional OLS regression: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
 Step 3: Discretionary accruals (DA) is the residuals of the regression in step 2: 
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
3.3.2 Modified-Jones model 
One problem with the Jones model is its low explanatory power, explaining only about 10% of the 
variation in accruals. The Jones model assumes that nondiscretionary accruals are stable over time after 
adjusting for business conditions and that revenue growth is fully nondiscretionary.  Dechow et al. (1995) 
argue that managers have considerable discretion over the accrual process and thus, they can mask 
manipulation as fundamental performance. There are certain situations when revenues are manipulated 
by the use of credit sales. For example, when managers use discretion to accrue revenues at year-end 
when the cash has not yet been received and it is highly questionable whether the revenues have been 
earned. The result of this managerial discretion will be an increase in revenues and total accruals (through 
                                                          
18 In this study, the terms discretionary/ non-discretionary accruals are used interchangeably with abnormal/ normal 
accruals, even though it is a somewhat loaded term that seems more associated with an active choice (abnormal) 
rather than an outcome of the measurement system or error (discretionary). 
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an increase in receivables). Therefore, Dechow et al. (1995) proposed a modified version of the Jones 
model which removes changes in receivables from changes in sales. The modified Jones model assumes 
that managing earnings by exercising discretion over revenue recognition on credit sales is easier than on 
cash sales. This model facilitates higher explanatory power by yielding a residual that is uncorrelated with 
normal revenue accruals (Dechow et al., 2010). This also means that the modified Jones model reduce the 
type II error which classifies abnormal accruals as fundamental performance. 
Discretionary accruals in this model can be calculated using four steps as in the Jones-model. The only 
difference is that in step 2, changes in receivables are subtracted from changes in revenue: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
3.3.3 Kothari model 
Both the Jones and modified-Jones models are subject to a high rate of type I error. This is because the 
residuals are positively correlated with total accruals, at about 80% (Dechow et al., 2003), meaning that a 
firm with high total accruals usually has high abnormal accruals. Such correlation raises concerns about 
whether abnormal accruals reflect accounting distortions. This means that these two models are subject 
to a high rate of type I error which classifies accruals as abnormal when they are a representation of 
fundamental performance.  
Kothari et al. (2005) suggest that type I error can be mitigated by controlling for the normal level of 
accruals based on return on assets (ROA). Accordingly, discretionary accruals for both firms are calculated 
based on the standard Jones or modified Jones model which also takes into account ROA. However, it 
should be noted that residuals (discretionary accruals) generated by this model explain only 10–12% of 
the variation in accruals (Dechow et al., 2010). Thus, this approach tends to add noise when measuring 
discretionary accruals. Kothari model is calculated using four steps as in the Jones model. The only 
difference is that ROA of last year is added in step 2: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
3.3.4 Approach used 
Consistent with previous studies, the modified-Jones model is used to measure earnings management in 
my study. However, detecting earnings management is difficult as it comes from unobservable managerial 
intent and each model has its advantages and drawbacks. Thus, this study also employs the other two 
models to cross-check the results of the modified-Jones model.  
The hypothesis of this study does not predict any specific direction for earnings management as managers 
have incentives to either increase or decrease income, as discussed earlier. Thus, I use the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals. As an additional advantage, the absolute value also captures accrual reversals 
following earnings management (Cohen et al., 2008). 
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3.4 Independent variables 
3.4.1 Board independence 
Although studies in corporate governance literature often use the term independent directors and the 
terms non-executive directors interchangeably, there is a clear distinction between these two concepts 
as specified by Circular 121. Circular 121 requires all listed firms in Vietnam to have at least one-third of 
independent directors on the board. Thus, I use the proportion of independent directors (IND) as a 
measurement for board independence in my study. This definition also reflects a higher level of board 
independence compared to using only the non-executive criterion as in other studies. IND is expected to 
be negatively correlated with AbsDA. 
It should be noted that an independent director in my study is not exactly defined as in Circular 121. 
Before 2012, the word “independent” only means “non-executive”. Therefore, the term “independent 
director” in firms’ annual reports actually means different things before and after Circular 121. To arrive 
at one single consistent measure for board independence during the time range of my study, I did not use 
firms’ classification but resort to other information available in annual reports to determine whether a 
director is independent or not. Most firms did not declare information about the relationship of their 
directors with business partners, legal advisors, or external auditors. Consequently, I could only check 3 
out of 5 criteria as stipulated by Circular 121. However, this definition is closer to that of Circular 121 
compared to the alternative definition of non-executive. As a robustness test, I also use the percentage 
of non-executive director (NED) as an indication of board independence. NED is declared by firms and is 
consistent across the years. 
3.4.2 Corporate governance reform 
I use a dichotomous variable denoted as REFORM to represent Circular 121. The interaction IND*REFORM 
is the second independent variable of interest. As stated in Hypothesis 2, this interaction term is expected 
to be negatively associated with earnings management. Circular 121 was issued on July 26th, 2012, by the 
Ministry of Finance and came into effect from September 17, 2012. Although Circular 121 was effective 
from September 17th, 2012, the “1/3 rule” started to be effective in 2013 to allow firms sufficient time to 
recruit independent directors. Therefore, the post-Circular period was chosen from 2013 onwards. Data 
were collected from 2009 to 2016. Thus, REFORM takes the value 0 for the years 2009 – 2012 (4 years) 
and 1 for the years 2013 – 2016 (4 years). The balance time range for the pre- and post-reform periods 
would help to produce an accurate comparison. In many studies (Liu & Yang, 2008; Peasnell et al., 2000), 
the year when the new regulation was introduced is removed because it is a transition year that is hard 
to determine if it should belong to the pre- or post-reform period. Although it is appropriate to include 
2012 in the pre-Circular period as explained above, I also include a robustness test that removes the year 
2012.  
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3.5 Control variables  
Besides board independence and corporate governance reform, there are other mechanisms to mitigate 
opportunistic earnings management, such as (i) board diversity (e.g. board size, separation of CEO and 
Board Chairman, the presence of women directors), (ii) ownership structure (e.g. the presence of 
controlling shareholders, State shareholders, foreign shareholders, and manager shareholders), and (iii) 
auditing practices (e.g. the quality of external auditor). These mechanisms are employed as control 
variables together with firm characteristics. 
3.5.1 Other corporate governance mechanisms  
Board size: I include board size given the well-documented correlation between board size and earnings 
management. A large number of directors on board can bring multiple resources to the firms. However, 
as board size increases, it will be more difficult to coordinate, align interests, and reach consensus on 
important decisions (O’Reilly et al., 1989). Jensen (1993) suggests that larger boards produce a less candid 
discussion of managerial performance and reduce the board joint power in resisting CEO dominance. 
Thus, as board size increase, earnings management also increase (Abdul Rahman & Haneem Mohamed 
Ali, 2006).  
CEO duality: According to the agency theory, the principal-agent problem is likely to occur when the CEO 
also takes the leading role of the board. Jensen (1993) noted that such a dual role would hinder the board’s 
ability to independently monitor the CEO. Directors would be unable or unwilling to evaluate the 
performance of a CEO with a dual role as he or she may be too powerful. Without effective monitoring 
from board members, the CEO would be able to “grade his or her homework” (Brickley et al., 1997, p.190) 
and have immense power to manage earnings. Klein (2002) and Dechow et al. (1996) document an 
increase in discretionary accruals when the CEO is also the Board Chairman. Lo et al. (2010) find that 
companies with CEO duality are more likely to manipulate earnings. Therefore, it is expected that CEO 
duality is positively correlated with earnings management.  
Presence of women directors: According to the resource-based theory, women directors, due to their 
different life experiences, contribute diverse perspectives to the boardroom and help to improve the 
quality of board decisions (Huse & Grethe Solberg, 2006). A board with gender diversity discharges their 
monitoring role better as women directors tend to be more careful and require more audit efforts and 
managerial accountability (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Thus, the presence of female directors on the board 
would help to mitigate earnings management as documented by several studies (Arun et al., 2015; 
Gavious et al., 2012).  
Ownership concentration: According to the agency theory, major shareholders, due to their larger stake, 
are more concerned with the firm performance. They often contribute to effective monitoring and help 
to reduce earnings management. In contrast, minority shareholders have little motivation to monitor 
managers and simply free ride on the effort of larger shareholders. Therefore, the monitoring 
performance of firms with a dispersed ownership structure may be inferior to those with more 
concentrated ownership (Dechow et al., 1996). Sáenz González & García-Meca (2014) find a negative 
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relationship between ownership concentration and earnings management among 435 listed Latin 
American firms. A similar finding is also documented by Bozec (2008) using 2057 firm-year observations 
for companies listed in Canada. Thus, ownership concentration is expected to have a negative relationship 
with earnings management. 
Managerial ownership: There is contradictory evidence on the relationship between managerial 
ownership and earnings management. On the one hand, owner-managers are strongly incentivized to 
drive a good performance because after all, maximizing firm wealth is also maximizing their wealth. Wang 
& Yung (2011) find that managerial ownership is negatively related to earnings management. On the other 
hand, Yang et al. (2008) report a positive impact of managerial ownership on the level of discretionary 
accruals, suggesting that owner-managers may encourage the opportunistic behavior of the manager to 
manipulate earnings. Therefore, managerial ownership is expected to have a correlation with earnings 
management. However, no specific direction of this correlation is predicted. 
Foreign ownership: From a resource-based view, firms need stakeholders with good monitoring 
capabilities to combat against earnings management. Foreign shareholders can be one of them as they 
may come from advanced markets with strong corporate governance (Douma et al., 2006). In contrast, 
domestic investors, due to their domestic affiliation, often have a complex web of business relationship 
with the firm and other domestic shareholders (Douma et al., 2006). Therefore, firms with higher foreign 
ownership are expected to manage earnings less. This view is supported by several studies include that of 
Guo et al. (2015) using 15,212 firm-year observations of Japanese listed firms and that of Kim & Yoon 
(2008) using 635 listed Korean firms. 
State ownership: Perhaps among domestic investors, the State is an important player. In Vietnam, the 
State still holds large ownership in many listed companies.  Chen & Zhang (2014) argue that controlling 
shareholders have strong incentives to mislead minority shareholders about economic performance by 
exaggerating firms’ earnings so that they can extract more benefits from the firm. This is particularly the 
case when the State is the large shareholders because they have even more influence over the firm. 
Therefore, earnings management is expected to positively correlate with State ownership.  
External auditor quality: Literature suggests that reputed external auditing service firms are more able to 
detect and mitigate earnings management due to their extensive experience in the field and highly 
qualified auditor employees (Rusmin, 2010). Based on a sample of 10,379 Big 6 and 2,179 non‐Big 6 firm 
years in the U.S., Becker et al. (1998) find that the mean and median of absolute discretionary accruals 
are greater for firms hiring non-Big 6 auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is 
associated with more “accounting flexibility”. Rusmin (2010) examines listed companies in Singapore and 
concludes that the magnitude of earnings management is significantly lower amongst firms employing a 
Big 4 auditor relative to firms that do not. 
3.5.2 Firm characteristics 
Firm size: Extant literature suggests that earnings reliability is higher among larger firms because these 
firms are subject to greater political/regulatory scrutiny (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In contrast, small firms 
36 
 
are more likely to have internal control deficiencies which allow managers more room to manipulate 
reported earnings (Kinney & McDaniel, 1989). Therefore, earnings management is expected to be 
negatively associated with firm size. 
Leverage: If higher leverage is indicative of a firm that is closer to a debt covenant restriction, then 
managers in more highly levered firms could be taking action to boost income or manipulate the financial 
statements to satisfy debt covenant requirements (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). DeFond & Jiambalvo 
(1994) report that managers use discretionary accruals to avoid costly debt covenant violations. 
Therefore, highly leveraged firms have greater incentives to manage earnings and leverage is expected to 
positively correlate with earnings management.   
Growth in assets: McNichols (2000) concludes that firms with higher growth rates are subject to a higher 
degree of earnings management. This is because when the speed at which firms grow exceeds the 
monitoring capacity of the board, internal control problems usually emerge. Taking into account these 
arguments, I include firm growth in assets as a control variable to account for cross-sectional differences 
among firms. 
Firm performance: Prior empirical studies find that discretionary accruals estimated from the standard 
and modified Jones models are correlated with performance and expected future earnings growth. Houqe 
et al. (2010) and Lee et al. (2006) document that discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones model 
are negatively correlated with ROE. Therefore, I include firm performance measured by ROE as a control 
variable. 
Operating cash flow: In this study, I also control for operating cash flow because firms with strong 
operating cash flow performance are less likely to employ income-increasing discretionary accruals (Lobo 
& Zhou, 2009). 
 
3.6 Data collection 
Timespan: The time range is from 2009 – 2016, dividing into 2 periods: pre-reform period covering the 
years 2009 – 2012 and the post-reform period covering the years 2013 – 2016.  
Stock exchanges: The study is conducted based on a sample of Vietnamese firms listed on both the Ho Chi 
Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX). 
Data sources: Financial information is extracted using two databases, namely ORBIS (orbis.bvdinfo.com) 
and Vietstock (finance.vietstock.vn).  
Criteria: A few criteria will be applied to the initial sample: 
 Banks, insurance companies, and financial institutions are excluded from the sample due to their 
special characteristics and the regulations governing them. They operate with very different cash 
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flow structures and capital policies. Thus, measurements for regular companies generally do not 
apply to these organizations. 
 Each firm must have at least 3 observations, either in the pre- or post-Circular period. 
 Each firm-year observation has the data necessary to calculate the discretionary accruals proxies 
employed in this study. 
 Each industry must have at least ten observations per year, consistent with Peasnell et al. (2000) 
The second criterion likely introduces a survivorship bias as it excludes smaller firms that are newly listed 
for less than 3 years. However, this bias likely reduces the variation in the earnings management metric, 
resulting in a more conservative test (Cohen et al., 2008). The initial sample is 754 firms which are all 
companies listed on HOSE and HNX as of June 2020. After applying the excluding criteria, the final sample 
includes 523 firms with 3774 firm-year observations. Excluding the financial industry, there are 9 
industries according to NACE industry classification code.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of all variables. AbsDA is absolute discretionary accruals calculated 
for each industry and year using the modified-Jones model. The mean (standard deviation) of AbsDA is 
11.1% (11.2%) for the pre-reform period and 11.2% (11.4%) for the post-reform period. These numbers 
are much higher than in other countries. For example, mean (standard deviation) of absolute discretionary 
accruals measured by the modified-Jones model is 7.7% (17.3%) in the U.S. (Klein, 2002), 4.6% (2.5%) in 
Canada (Bozec, 2008), 7.4% (7.9%) in Taiwan (Chen et al., 2007), and 8.5% (6.2%) in China (Chen & Zhang, 
2014).  
There is a slight increase in AbsDA, however, this increase is not statistically significant. Similarly, there 
are no significant changes in both Positive_DA (income-increasing accruals) and Negative_DA (income-
decreasing accruals). There are more observations with Negative_DA than with Positive_DA in the pre-
reform period. However, this situation is reversed in the post-reform period. Lobo & Zhou (2009) consider 
companies with income-increasing (positive) discretionary accruals as aggressive and companies with 
income-decreasing (negative) discretionary accruals as conservative. This suggests that Vietnamese listed 
firms are more aggressive after the reform.  
The mean IND for the full period is 41.0%. However, the standard deviation is quite high, at 22.2%, which 
means that there is a big gap in the board independence level between the best and the worst companies. 
Minimum value of IND is 0.0% (221 observations) and maximum value of IND is 100.0% (32 observations). 
Mean IND also increased from 37.3% pre-reform to 44.1% post-reform and this increase is statistically 
significant. Before the Circular, 59.3% of observations have at least one-third of independent directors on 
the board. After the Circular, although this number increased to 70.3%, 66 observations from 38 
companies still did not have any independent directors. It should be noted that the criteria for an 
independent director as outlined in the rule are stricter than in my study and therefore, the actual mean 
of IND may be lower and the actual number of non-complying companies may be higher. For the means 
of IND and AbsDA by industry, please refer to Appendix 1. Mean NED is 59.5% and similar to IND, it also 
experienced an increase from 56.4% to 62.0%.  
Figure 2 shows the movements in means of AbsDA and IND from 2009 – 2016. While AbsDA fluctuates, 
IND consistently increases over the years. The trend towards a more independent board is consistent with 
the results documented by the Report by IFC (2017) and other Vietnamese studies (To & Suzuki, 2019; 
Essa et al., 2016). However, the magnitude of change of IND from 2009 – 2012 seems to be higher than 
from 2013 – 2016.  
The board size of all companies ranges from a minimum of 3 members to a maximum of 11 members 
which is consistent with the requirement of Circular 121. Because more independent directors have been 
fitted into the board, it is not surprising that the board size has increased. However, this increase is 
marginal, from 5.45 to 5.49 directors. This implies that most companies did not simply add independent 
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directors to their board. The board composition was probably adjusted by eliminating a few original 
directors because maintaining a larger board might be costly for firms. 
Significant changes across the two windows are also evident for other control variables. For example, the 
propensity to appoint women directors on the board increased from 42.6% to 53.0%. Less CEO assumed 
the dual role of Board Chairman with a reduction from 40.6% to 27.2%. However, DUAL is still high 
compared to other countries (Lai, 2011; Lo et al., 2010). CEO duality is allowed by law if accepted by 
shareholders. The appointment of a lead independent director is still an unfamiliar practice in Vietnam 
(IFC, 2017). More companies also appointed Big 4 external auditors compared to the pre-Circular period. 
The mean percentage of outstanding stocks owned by major shareholders increases from 46.9% to 50.0%, 
much higher than other countries (Bozec, 2008; Sáenz González & García-Meca, 2014). Managerial 
ownership also goes up from 7.4% to 9.7%. Foreign investors hold more shares on average, increasing 
from 5.5% to 7.8%. However, State ownership decreases from 27.6% to 19.6% which is in line with the 
equitization plan of the government. The State is a controlling shareholder with more than 50% ownership 
in 188 companies.  
Overall, these results suggest that Vietnamese listed firms were adopting stronger corporate governance 
practices in the post-reform period. These results are also consistent with the report that overall 
corporate governance scores for Vietnamese listed firms improved from 2012 – 2016 (IFC, 2017). 
For firm characteristics, the mean leverage as measured by total liabilities over total assets is 49.9%. Mean 
assets growth of 23.1% and mean ROE of 12.4% is quite higher than in other countries (Sáenz González & 
García-Meca, 2014). The cash flow from operations scaled by total assets is 13.2%.  
Before conducting regression analysis, the relationship between the dependent, independent, and control 
variables can be briefly examined using Pearson's correlation matrix. Table 4 below shows the correlation 
coefficients and their significance. As can be seen, the highest coefficient of 0.47 is between BIG4 and 
FIRM_SIZE. This means that larger firms are more likely to hire Big4 external auditors. The second highest 
coefficient is 0.43 between OWN_CON and OWN_STATE. This is because most of the time, OWN_STATE 
is larger than 5% and therefore is counted in OWN_CON. All the other coefficients are below 0.4 thus 
giving little cause for concern due to the problem of collinearity. To make sure that there is no serious 
correlation between more than two variables, I also use check VIFs. All VIFs are less than 2, suggesting 
that the risk of bias due to multicollinearity is minimal. Please refer to Appendix 2 for details of VIFs. 
Overall, all the proposed variables in the model can be retained. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 Pre-reform (2009 – 2012)  Post-reform (2013 – 2016)  Difference 
  N Mean S.D. Median   N Mean S.D. Median   Change T-stat 
AbsDA 1694 0.111 0.112 0.079  2069 0.112 0.114 0.080  -0.001 -0.25 
Positive_DA 828 0.110 0.113 0.074  1119 0.117 0.122 0.080  0.002 0.51 
Negative_DA 866 -0.109 0.096 -0.082  950 -0.104 0.092 -0.080  0.003 0.76 
NED 1695 0.564 0.195 0.600  2069 0.620 0.189 0.600  0.052*** 8.05 
IND 1678 0.373 0.220 0.400  2068 0.441 0.220 0.400  0.065*** 9.17 
BOARD_SIZE 1705 5.450 1.164 5.000  2069 5.493 1.109 5.000  0.070** 2.15 
DUAL 1701 0.406 0.491 0.000  2069 0.272 0.445 0.000  -0.134*** -7.75 
WOMEN 1701 0.426 0.495 0.000  2069 0.530 0.499 1.000  0.110*** 7.15 
OWN_CON 1666 0.469 0.205 0.510  2067 0.500 0.212 0.519  0.037*** 6.44 
OWN_MNG 1656 0.074 0.119 0.020  2066 0.097 0.123 0.040  0.025*** 5.60 
OWN_FOR 1670 0.055 0.111 0.003  2061 0.078 0.123 0.019  0.027*** 7.62 
OWN_STATE 1683 0.273 0.245 0.260  2066 0.196 0.245 0.000  -0.071*** -13.06 
BIG4 1677 0.185 0.389 0.000  2069 0.240 0.427 0.000  0.072*** 6.27 
FIRM_SIZE (€ Mil.) 1705 54.37 143.63 6.78  2069 80.48 283.42 20.265  30.42*** 22.25 
LEV 1705 0.508 0.214 0.541  2069 0.492 0.223 0.512  -0.011** -2.15 
GROWTH_A 1704 0.350 7.475 0.110  2069 0.132 0.458 0.053  -0.221 -1.29 
ROA 1705 0.075 0.084 0.057  2069 0.059 0.084 0.046  -0.017*** -6.85 
OCF 1694 0.142 0.213 0.118   2069 0.124 0.205 0.104   -0.023*** -3.47 
AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent directors on the board. An 
independent director is defined as not holding an executive position in the firm or related parties of the firm, and not having 
a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, or external auditors of the 
firm. *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
 
Figure 2: Movements in mean earnings management and board independence from 2009 – 2016 
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Table 4: Pearson correlation matrix 
  
AbsDA IND REFORM 
BOARD_ 
SIZE 
DUAL WOMEN 
OWN_ 
CON 
OWN_ 
MNG 
OWN_ 
FOR 
OWN_ 
STATE 
AbsDA 1.00                   
IND 0.01 1.00         
REFORM 0.00 0.15*** 1.00        
BOARD_SIZE -0.04* 0.09*** 0.00 1.00       
DUAL -0.01 -0.05** -0.14*** 0.01 1.00      
WOMEN 0.02 0.01 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.03 1.00     
OWN_CON -0.04* -0.14*** 0.07*** -0.02 -0.15*** -0.03 1.00    
OWN_MNG -0.01 -0.18*** 0.09*** 0.01 0.25*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 1.00   
OWN_FOR -0.04* 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.25*** -0.01 0.11*** 0.10*** -0.02 1.00  
OWN_STATE -0.08*** -0.21*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.19*** 0.43*** -0.10*** -0.18*** 1.00 
BIG4 -0.04** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.16*** -0.08*** -0.02 0.17*** 0.00 0.27*** 0.02 
FIRM_SIZE -0.01 0.05** 0.07*** 0.30*** -0.04* 0.03 0.14*** 0.05** 0.26*** -0.00 
LEV -0.00 -0.12*** -0.04* -0.03 0.02 -0.10*** 0.04* 0.06*** -0.16*** 0.10*** 
GROWTH_A 0.29*** 0.04* -0.04* 0.03 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.03* 0.01 -0.10*** 
ROA -0.00 -0.06*** -0.10*** 0.06*** -0.00 0.02 0.10*** -0.04* 0.11*** 0.10*** 
OCF 0.18*** -0.03 -0.04* 0.04** 0.01 0.02 0.05** -0.02 0.08*** 0.00 
 
  
BIG4 
FIRM_ 
SIZE 
LEV GROWTH_A ROA OCF 
BIG4 1.00      
FIRM_SIZE 0.47*** 1.00     
LEV 0.05** 0.34*** 1.00    
GROWTH_A -0.00 0.12*** 0.05** 1.00   
ROA -0.00 -0.07*** -0.41*** 0.09*** 1.00  
OCF -0.00 0.00 -0.29*** 0.31*** 0.54*** 1.00 
AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent directors on the board. An independent director 
is defined as not holding an executive position in the firm or related parties of the firm, and not having a direct relationship with any 
major shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, or external auditors of the firm. *, **, or *** indicate that the 
coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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4.2 Regression results 
Table 5 reports the regression results using OLS with industry and year fixed effects. The number of 
observations is 3624 which is lower than the total sample size because the regression only includes firm-
year observations that have no missing data for all variables. The main model is Model 2 which includes 
all the variables of interest. Model 1 excludes the interaction term IND*REFORM. Model 3 – 7 excludes a 
few corporate governance variables to test for the robustness of Model 2.  The adjusted R-square of all 
models ranges from 10.3% to 11.7% which is similar to other studies on earnings management in Vietnam 
(e.g. Essa et al., 2016; Hoang et al., 2017). 
The F-test and Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test are both significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that there are both fixed effects and random effects in the model. Therefore, as a robust check, I also 
present the results of FEM and REM in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5. Woolridge test for autocorrelation has 
a p-value of 0.007, suggesting the presence of the autocorrelation within the model. As a remedy, I use 
robust standard errors with all the three regression models (Baltagi, 2013; Bliss et al., 2015).  
4.2.1 Board independence 
In Model 1, the coefficient of IND is negative but insignificant, meaning that the proportion of independent 
directors does not have an impact on the reliability of reported earnings information among Vietnamese 
listed companies. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is rejected. This finding is contrasting to the mainstream of 
theories and empirical evidence and it puts the role of Vietnamese independent directors into question. 
This correlation remains insignificant in the post-reform period. In Model 2, both IND and the dummy 
variable REFORM are negative but insignificant. Interestingly, the interaction term IND*REFORM is 
positive (0.009) which is contrasting to the initial expectation. However, this coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. The results in Model 3 – 7 provides similar results. These results are consistent in the 
robustness tests using FEM (Appendix 4) and REM (Appendix 5). 
Overall, after controlling for corporate governance and firm characteristics variables, there is no evidence 
that Circular 121 helps to strengthen the monitoring role of the board of directors who are responsible 
for reducing earnings management. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is also rejected. This finding is contrasting to 
the majority of studies in advanced markets such as the U.S. or the U.K. (Cohen et al., 2008; Lobo & Zhou, 
2009; Peasnell et al., 2000). However, it is similar to studies in Vietnam and other emerging markets. For 
example, Vu et al. (2018) find that the independent directors, the number of women directors, and 
Chairman – CEO duality have no significant impact on the performance of Vietnamese firms.  
Some studies even find that board independence increase earnings management and decrease firm 
performance. A study done by Nguyen et al. (2017) reveals that independent directors have an overall 
negative effect on firm operating performance and this negative relationship is stronger in firms where 
the State is a controlling shareholder. In China, firms with more independent boards manage earnings 
more during the IPO process (Liu et al., 2014). Studying the Taiwanese market, Chen et al. (2007) find that 
that the mandatory formation of independent directorships is associated with higher earnings 
management following the enactment of the Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles.   
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4.2.2 Other corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics 
The coefficient of BOARD_SIZE is negative and significant at the 5% level across all the models. This means 
that a smaller board helps to reduce earnings management which is consistent with the notion that as 
board size increases, it will be more difficult to produce a candid discussion and to reach consensus on 
important decisions, all of which reduce the board joint power in resisting CEO dominance (Jensen, 1993; 
O’Reilly et al., 1989). Thus, a larger board monitors managers less effectively. In contrast, there is no 
evidence that CEO duality (DUAL), women directors (WOMEN), and reputation of external auditors (BIG4) 
are correlated with earnings management.  
Regarding ownership structure, only OWN_FOR is found to have a significant effect on earnings 
management. The coefficient for OWN_FOR is negative and significant at the 5% levels in all the 4 models 
in which it is included, suggesting that foreign investors are effective monitors and help to reduce earnings 
management. Often coming from advanced markets, foreign shareholders bring good corporate 
governance practices with them to markets with weaker corporate governance regimes (Douma et al., 
2006). The coefficient of OWN_STATE is negative and significant at the 10% level in Model 1 and Model 
3. However, it is insignificant in all the other models. Overall, there is no consistent evidence that 
OWN_STATE, OWN_CON, and OWN_MNG helps to reduce earnings management. Contrasting with extant 
literature, major shareholders, owner-managers, and the State do not act as monitoring mechanisms to 
mitigate opportunistic behavior among managers.   
FIRM_SIZE is significantly negative in 4 out of 7 regression models, suggesting that larger firms manage 
earnings less because they are subject to greater regulatory scrutiny and investor attention (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). LEV is insignificant in all models. GROWTH_A is positive and strongly significant at the 
1% level. This result indicates that high growth companies tend to have less reliable earnings. This is 
probably due to internal control problems when the speed at which firms grow exceeds the monitoring 
capacity of the board (McNichols, 2000). Firm performance as measured by ROA is also significantly 
negative across all the models, indicating that firms with lower performance are likely to manage earnings 
more to meet performance targets and investor expectations (Dechow et al., 1995; Lee et al., 2006). In 
contrast to my expectation, OCF is positively correlated with AbsDA and this correlation is strongly 
significant at the 1% level across all models. Firms with strong operating cash flows tend to be more 
opportunistic and manage earnings to a higher extent. Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) explain that operating 
cash flows may be a tool for firms to manage earnings rather than a cause. 
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Table 5: Regression results of the main model using OLS 
 
Exp. 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
IND - -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.011 
  (-0.34) (-0.63) (-0.62) (-0.58) (-0.57) (-0.61) (-0.86) 
REFORM -  -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 
   (-0.76) (-0.63) (-0.55) (-0.64) (-0.51) (-0.83) 
IND*REFORM -  0.009 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.013 
   (0.53) (0.48) (0.60) (0.62) (0.69) (0.78) 
BOARD_SIZE - -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.004** 
  (-2.28) (-2.29) (-2.25) (-2.37) (-2.26) (-1.99) (-2.42) 
DUAL + -0.004 -0.004  -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.87) (-0.91)  (-0.96) (-0.65) (-0.99) (-0.99) 
WOMEN - 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 
  (1.12) (1.11)  (1.18) (1.29) (1.41) (1.14) 
OWN_CON - 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.008    
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.18) (-0.87)    
OWN_MNG ? -0.011 -0.010 -0.014  -0.007   
  (-0.68) (-0.62) (-0.88)  (-0.43)   
OWN_FOR - -0.034** -0.034** -0.034**   -0.031**  
  (-2.12) (-2.11) (-2.10)   (-1.99)  
OWN_STATE + -0.015* -0.015 -0.016*    -0.012 
  (-1.65) (-1.64) (-1.76)    (-1.46) 
BIG4 - -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 
  (-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.80) (-1.08) (-1.33) (-0.85) (-1.11) 
FIRM_SIZE - -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** 
  (-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.41) (-2.12) (-2.06) (-1.77) (-2.18) 
LEV + -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 
  (-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.36) (-0.09) (-0.11) (-0.40) (0.09) 
GROWTH_A + 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
  (5.58) (5.58) (5.59) (5.70) (5.70) (5.68) (5.68) 
ROA - -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.147*** -0.140*** 
  (-2.64) (-2.63) (-2.63) (-2.73) (-2.77) (-2.80) (-2.64) 
OCF - 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
  (3.41) (3.41) (3.39) (3.44) (3.44) (3.46) (3.44) 
Constant  0.160*** 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.168*** 0.163*** 0.157*** 0.170*** 
  (7.23) (7.19) (7.13) (7.64) (7.41) (7.05) (7.75) 
N  3624 3624 3624 3682 3674 3677 3694 
Adjusted R2   0.117 0.117 0.117 0.116 0.116 0.117 0.117 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is OLS with robust standard error clustered by firm. Dependent variable 
AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent directors on the board. An 
independent director is defined as not holding an executive position in the firm or related parties of the firm, and not having 
a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, or external auditors of 
the firm.  *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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4.3 Additional analysis 
Dechow & Ge (2006) suggest that earnings are affected not only by the magnitude and but also by the 
sign of discretionary accruals. Positive accruals are indicative of firms increasing their assets, while 
negative accruals are indicative of firms reducing their asset base and downsizing. The accounting rules 
that apply to growing and declining firms differ vastly (Dechow & Ge, 2006). Specifically, negative accrual 
firms have more transitory earnings than positive accrual firms because of balance sheet adjustments 
relating to special items.  For example, they find that in almost all firms with large negative accruals that 
also had special items, the special items are accrual adjustments (e.g. impairment charges). Therefore, 
examining firms with negative and positive accruals separately may provide additional insights into 
earnings management. 
As shown in Table 6, for Positive_DA, the coefficient of IND is insignificant. For Negative_DA, IND is 
significantly positive at the 10% level in both Model 1 (0.022) and Model 2 (0.037). This means that 
independent directors help to decrease earnings management in firms that manage earnings upward but 
have no impact on firms that manage earnings downward.  Please note that for Negative_DA, less earnings 
management means higher value (or less negative and closer to 0), which is opposite to Positive_DA. Lobo 
& Zhou (2009) regard companies with income-increasing (positive) discretionary accruals as aggressive 
and those with income-decreasing (negative) discretionary accruals as conservative. Thus, independent 
directors discharge their monitoring role and help to reflect more accurate earnings information in 
conservative firms but not aggressive firms. 
The interaction term IND*REFORM remains insignificant when regressed against Positive_DA and 
Negative_DA. These results suggest that under mandatory formation, a more independent board has no 
impact on earnings management, whether it is to increase or to decrease income.  
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Table 6: Regression results using signed discretionary  
 
 Exp. Positive DA  Exp. Negative DA 
 sign Model 1 Model 2  sign Model 1 Model 2 
IND - 0.012 0.012   + 0.022** 0.037** 
  (1.03) (0.77)   (2.10) (2.42) 
POST121 -  0.006  +  0.030** 
   (0.39)    (2.18) 
IND*POST121 -  -0.001  +  -0.027 
   (-0.06)    (-1.41) 
BOARD_SIZE - -0.005** -0.005**  + -0.001 -0.001 
  (-2.40) (-2.40)   (-0.66) (-0.61) 
DUAL + 0.004 0.004  - 0.005 0.005 
  (0.77) (0.77)   (1.08) (1.17) 
WOMEN - 0.006 0.006  + -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.29) (1.29)   (-0.47) (-0.45) 
OWN_CON - -0.003 -0.003  + -0.015 -0.014 
  (-0.19) (-0.19)   (-1.29) (-1.22) 
OWN_MNG ? 0.011 0.011  ? 0.040** 0.037** 
  (0.50) (0.49)   (2.32) (2.13) 
OWN_FOR - -0.032 -0.032  + 0.021 0.020 
  (-1.60) (-1.60)   (1.16) (1.10) 
OWN_STATE + -0.018 -0.018  - 0.009 0.009 
  (-1.56) (-1.56)   (0.90) (0.90) 
BIG4 - -0.009 -0.009  + -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.51) (-1.51)   (-0.19) (-0.26) 
FIRM_SIZE - 0.001 0.001  + 0.004** 0.004** 
  (0.39) (0.39)   (2.29) (2.34) 
LEV + 0.048*** 0.048***  + 0.010 0.010 
  (2.91) (2.91)   (0.68) (0.68) 
GROWTH_A + 0.050*** 0.050***  + 0.017** 0.017** 
  (2.93) (2.92)   (2.21) (2.26) 
ROE - -0.331*** -0.331***  - -0.247*** -0.248*** 
  (-5.81) (-5.81)   (-2.91) (-2.90) 
CFO - 0.294*** 0.294***  - 0.271*** 0.271*** 
  (8.42) (8.42)   (10.16) (10.17) 
Constant  0.042 0.042   -0.187*** -0.195*** 
  (1.54) (1.51)   (-6.45) (-6.72) 
N  1717 1717   1907 1907 
Adjusted R2   0.385 0.384    0.162 0.163 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is OLS with robust standard error clustered by firm. 
Dependent variable AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive 
position in the firm or related parties of the firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major 
shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, or external auditors of the firm.  *, **, or 
*** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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4.4 Robustness tests 
4.4.1 Alternative measurement of earnings management 
Besides the modified-Jones model, I use the original Jones model (1991) and Kothari (2005) model as two 
alternative measurements for earnings management. Regression results using OLS with robust standard 
errors and industry-firm fixed effects presented in Table 7 show that except for FIRM_SIZE that becomes 
insignificant, all the other regression results are similar to the results found by the modified-Jones model. 
Thus, independent directors and corporate governance reform are ineffective in reducing earnings 
management across its different measurements. 
4.4.2 Alternative measurements of board independence 
Compared to independent directors, non-executive directors may face fewer challenges in monitoring 
managers and because they are more connected to the firms. For example, they may own a larger stake 
in the company or represent major shareholders and thus, may have more interest and power to 
effectively monitor managers. Therefore, I used NED which represents the percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board as an alternative proxy for board independence. Again, regression results as 
presented in Table 8 show that NED has no relationship with AbsDA. Non-executive directors still probably 
lack the knowledge and capabilities to discharge their monitoring role. The significance of other variables 
remains unchanged. Besides, I also test the results using the dummy variable IND_D denoting the 
presence of independent directors. Appendix 6 shows consistent results.  
4.4.3 Alternative measurement of control variables 
Different measurements of control variables might lead to different results. Therefore, as a sensitivity 
check, I use alternative definitions for several control variables as follow: 
 OWN_CON_D is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if shares owned by major shareholders 
is larger than 50% of outstanding shares (Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 2007; Klein, 2002).  
 OWN_STATE_2 is the square of holding owned by the State (Essa et al., 2016; Hoang et al., 2014). 
 LEV_LOAN is leverage as measured by total loan outstanding divided by total assets (Ali and 
Zhang, 2015) 
 GROWTH_S is growth in sales  (McNichols, 2000) 
 ROE is the return on assets divided by total assets  (Houque, 2011) 
 CFO_A is cash flow from operations calculated from working capital (account receivables –  
inventory – account payables (Ali and Zhang, 2015) lagged by total assets. 
Results in Appendix 7 show that IND and IND*REFORM are still insignificant. OWN_STATE_2 and CON_D 
are still insignificant. Except for LEV_LOAN and GROWTH_S that is insignificant, all the other control 
variables are similar to the main results. Please refer to Appendix 3 for more details. Details of the 
descriptive statistics of alternative control variables are also shown in Appendix 7. 
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4.4.4 Excluding 2012 and sample partition 
When examining the impact of regulation changes (Liu & Yang, 2008; Peasnell et al., 2000), many studies 
exclude the year when the regulation is issued because this year is transitional. Therefore, I also checked 
if removing 2012 changed the results. Accordingly, the new pre-reform period is from 2009 – 2011 (3 
years). To create a comparable time window, the post-reform period is from 2013 – 2015 (3 years). Again, 
IND and IND*REFORM are insignificant across all 7 models. Please refer to Appendix 8 for more details. 
Instead of using the interaction term with dummy variable REFORM, I also separate the sample according 
to the pre- and post-reform period and regress the two subsamples separately. Besides being a robustness 
test for board independence, running regression for each subsample may allow us to know more about 
the impact of Circular 121 on all the other control variables. Consistent with other tests, IND is insignificant 
in both the pre and post periods. More details of regression results are shown in Appendix 9.  
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Table 7: Regression results using alternative measurements of absolute discretionary accruals 
 
 Exp. Jones  Kothari 
  sign Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
IND - -0.003 -0.008   -0.003 -0.008 
  (-0.34) (-0.63)  (-0.34) (-0.63) 
REFORM -  -0.009   -0.009 
   (-0.76)   (-0.76) 
IND*REFORM -  0.009   0.009 
   (0.53)   (0.53) 
BOARD_SIZE ? -0.004** -0.004**  -0.004** -0.004** 
  (-2.28) (-2.29)  (-2.28) (-2.29) 
DUAL + -0.004 -0.004  -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.87) (-0.91)  (-0.87) (-0.91) 
WOMEN - 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.004 
  (1.12) (1.11)  (1.12) (1.11) 
OWN_CON - 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
  (0.06) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) 
OWN_MNG ? -0.011 -0.010  -0.011 -0.010 
  (-0.68) (-0.62)  (-0.68) (-0.62) 
OWN_FOR - -0.034** -0.034**  -0.034** -0.034** 
  (-2.12) (-2.11)  (-2.12) (-2.11) 
OWN_STATE + -0.015* -0.015  -0.015* -0.015 
  (-1.65) (-1.64)  (-1.65) (-1.64) 
BIG4 - -0.004 -0.004  -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.79) (-0.77)  (-0.79) (-0.77) 
FIRM_SIZE - -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 -0.002 
  (-1.46) (-1.48)  (-1.46) (-1.48) 
LEV + -0.003 -0.003  -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.28) (-0.27)  (-0.28) (-0.27) 
GROWTH_A + 0.067*** 0.067***  0.067*** 0.067*** 
  (5.58) (5.58)  (5.58) (5.58) 
ROA - -0.142*** -0.141***  -0.142*** -0.141*** 
  (-2.64) (-2.63)  (-2.64) (-2.63) 
OCF - 0.082*** 0.082***  0.082*** 0.082*** 
  (3.41) (3.41)  (3.41) (3.41) 
Constant  0.160*** 0.163***  0.160*** 0.163*** 
  (7.23) (7.19)  (7.23) (7.19) 
N  3624 3624  3624 3624 
Adjusted R2   0.117 0.117   0.117 0.117 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is OLS with robust standard error clustered 
by firm. Dependent variable AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. An independent director is defined as not 
holding an executive position in the firm or related parties of the firm, and not having a direct 
relationship with any major shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, or 
external auditors of the firm.  *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at 
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Regression results using the percentage of non-executive directors (NED) as an alternative 
measurement of board independence 
  
Exp. 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
NED - 0.006 -0.011 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.010 
  (0.54) (-0.75) (-0.64) (-0.46) (-0.41) (-0.44) (-0.65) 
REFORM -  -0.026* -0.024 -0.022 -0.022 -0.019 -0.025* 
   (-1.74) (-1.63) (-1.55) (-1.50) (-1.36) (-1.72) 
NED*REFORM -  0.031 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.030 
   (1.57) (1.52) (1.48) (1.41) (1.44) (1.57) 
BOARD_SIZE ? -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.004** 
  (-2.24) (-2.28) (-2.24) (-2.37) (-2.25) (-2.00) (-2.46) 
DUAL + -0.003 -0.003  -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.70) (-0.85)  (-0.74) (-0.48) (-0.73) (-0.79) 
WOMEN - 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 
  (1.13) (1.11)  (1.23) (1.29) (1.43) (1.20) 
OWN_CON - -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.009    
  (-0.01) (-0.04) (0.07) (-0.94)    
OWN_MNG ? -0.009 -0.006 -0.009  -0.003   
  (-0.51) (-0.34) (-0.53)  (-0.18)   
OWN_FOR - -0.034** -0.033** -0.033**   -0.031**  
  (-2.13) (-2.06) (-2.05)   (-2.08)  
OWN_STATE + -0.014 -0.015 -0.015*    -0.011 
  (-1.51) (-1.57) (-1.67)    (-1.39) 
BIG4 - -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 
  (-0.85) (-0.83) (-0.88) (-1.13) (-1.41) (-0.92) (-1.17) 
FIRM_SIZE - -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** 
  (-1.57) (-1.55) (-1.50) (-2.18) (-2.16) (-1.85) (-2.22) 
LEV + -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.003 
  (-0.14) (-0.15) (-0.22) (0.10) (0.04) (-0.25) (0.26) 
GROWTH_A + 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
  (5.58) (5.56) (5.57) (5.67) (5.69) (5.66) (5.66) 
ROA - -0.143*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.148*** -0.142*** 
  (-2.70) (-2.67) (-2.67) (-2.81) (-2.83) (-2.86) (-2.71) 
OCF - 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 
  (3.45) (3.45) (3.43) (3.53) (3.48) (3.49) (3.53) 
Constant  0.158*** 0.168*** 0.165*** 0.171*** 0.166*** 0.159*** 0.173*** 
  (7.11) (7.25) (7.23) (7.58) (7.33) (6.98) (7.65) 
N  3636 3636 3636 3696 3686 3692 3710 
Adjusted R2  0.117 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.117 0.117 0.118 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is OLS with robust standard error clustered by firm. Dependent 
variable AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. NED is the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board. *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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4.5 Discussion 
The insignificant results of IND and the interaction term IND*REFORM are consistent across three 
different regression models and various robustness tests, implying that independent directors do not help 
to reduce earnings management among Vietnamese listed firms. There are four possible explanations for 
this finding. 
4.5.1 Limitations of Vietnamese regulation 
The first explanation concerns the limitations of Vietnamese regulations in general and of Circular 121 in 
particular. With a short period of establishment, the Vietnamese stock market has been expanded rapidly, 
while legitimate regulations are not strong enough to monitor the market. The big gap between legal 
regulations and their implementation adds difficulties in establishing a strong corporate governance 
framework. According to McGee (2009), corporate governance laws and regulations in Vietnam are often 
incomplete and have many conflicts as well as inconsistencies. This is likely to be true in the case of Circular 
121. Although clearly defining the term “independent director”, the Circular does not provide specific 
guidance on the duties of independent directors. Circular 121 only states the general responsibilities of 
all board members. Therefore, it is possible that independent directors may not understand what they 
should or should not do, how their role is different from other board members, and what could be 
challenging for them when participating in the board of directors (Nguyen et al., 2019).  
Besides, weak enforcement with no sanctions for firms that fail to follow corporate governance rules often 
renders established laws and regulations ineffective. In recent years, although the Vietnamese 
Government has made many efforts to improve corporate governance, violations are still complicated, 
and appointing independent directors is mainly at firms’ discretion (Tran, 2020). Therefore, it is no surprise 
that legal regulations on board independence fail to be enforceable and effective. 
Weak enforcement is perhaps a common characteristic of many emerging markets where corporate 
governance rules are largely learned from advanced economies. According to Pistor et al. (2002), legal 
transplantation is not an easy (and certainly not a short-term) solution for countries with less developed 
legal systems. Countries that adopt foreign law are often underprepared for it or the changes it brings. 
Thus, Vietnam needs to strengthen its corporate governance framework so that regulatory reform can 
fully discharge its effectiveness. Eventually, the strategy for reform is “not to create an ideal set of rules 
and then see how well they can be enforced, but rather to enact the rules that can be enforced within the 
existing structure” (La Porta et al., 2000; p.22). 
4.5.2 Underdeveloped market for independent directors 
Before 2012, the terms “independent director” and “non-executive director” were used interchangeably.  
Therefore, an “independent director” that satisfied many other criteria besides being non-executive as 
outlined in Circular 121 was a new concept. Conducting a survey based on 170 independent directors from 
listed companies in Vietnam, Nguyen et al. (2019) report that 48% of the respondents are in their 30s, 
66% have less than three years’ experience sitting on the board of any company, and 69% have a 
bachelor’s degree.  
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The relatively young age and limited experience of the participants in the survey reflect that independent 
directors are a recent addition to board and most of them lack experience in performing this new role. 
Since the term “independent directors” was only introduced in 2012, most of the directors do not have 
extensive experience in that capacity and they may have been recruited just to fulfill legal requirements. 
Additionally, the Circular does not require or recommend certain qualifications of independent directors. 
Therefore, it could be the case that Vietnamese independent directors meet the independence criteria 
but do not have sufficient capabilities to perform their roles. 
The case of China is also illustrative of a pre-mature market for independent directors. Studying the 
effectiveness of independent directors in China, Lai (2011) also found the relationship between earnings 
management and board independence to be insignificant when the adoption of independent directors is 
made mandatory. This finding suggests that the regulatory requirement on quantity might bring about a 
gap in quality. 
On the demand side, as appointing a qualified independent director would bring costs and take time, firms 
may choose to reduce these costs by searching for candidates who might be close ties of the company 
(Meng et al., 2018). In this case, setting a numerical target for outside directors may be merely window-
dressing. For example, a CEO can select directors who are independent as per legal requirements but are 
actually his or her close friends. Although there is no rigorous methodology to examine the validity of this 
hypothesis, this seems to be likely in Vietnam. In the Vietnamese trust-based culture, it takes time to 
transform independent directors’ general expertise to the needs of the firm and to coordinate them with 
the current management team (Nguyen, 2019). Eventually, social ties could be an influencing factor that 
impacts the decision to appoint independent directors.   
4.5.3 Independent directors prefer the advisory role 
It should also be noted that independent directors in Vietnam place more emphasis on their advisory role 
than monitoring role. According to Nguyen et al., (2019), for Vietnamese independent directors, 
contributing to the development of corporate strategy is more important than providing an independent 
check on corporate control. This finding is different from extant literature on board independence which 
posits that the primary responsibility of directors is to monitor managers (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). 
However, it may reflect the distinctive situation of many transitional economies where there are various 
barriers for independent directors to discharge their monitoring function. Factors such as high State 
ownership, the dominance of large shareholders, weak investor protection, and lack of experience and 
capability may undermine the monitoring role of independent directors (Cheung et al., 2008).  
These circumstances are also relevant to Vietnam. High ownership concentration, high State ownership, 
and CEO duality are common in listed Vietnamese companies. In my study, 56.6% of observations have 
ownership concentration of at least 50%, the State has at least 50% of ownership in 29% of observations, 
and 33.2% of observations have CEO duality. The State commonly appoints representatives to the board 
and one of them is usually the Chairman. As a result, independent directors may prefer to undertake an 
advisory role to avoid possible conflicts with management and controlling shareholders. This may be 
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particularly true in a business environment under a collectivist culture such as that of Vietnam where 
individual relationships are important and people tend to avoid conflicts with their business partners 
(Vuong et al., 2013). This finding may explain why Vietnamese independent directors prefer to execute 
their advisory function over their monitoring function. 
4.5.4 Information asymmetry and high information costs 
Although independent directors generally have a better overview of the industry, they often have a less 
specific understanding of the day-to-day business compared to inside directors (Uribe-Bohorquez et al., 
2018; Weisbach, 1988). Independent directors are outsiders, and they have limited access to information. 
Only when the CEO or insiders are willing to share information with them can they undertake their roles 
effectively. Hooghiemstra & van Manen (2004) propose the “independence paradox” in which 
independent directors need to monitor management independently, but have to rely on the information 
provided by management. This is also a challenge for Vietnamese independent directors who cited that 
they often lack information and executive directors holding back information (Nguyen, 2019).  
The relatively low level of disclosure and transparency in the Vietnamese investment environment is also 
associated with increasing information acquisition costs which prevent independent directors from 
performing an effective monitoring role (Duchin et al., 2010). Studying Chinese listed firms, Meng et al. 
(2018) find that independent directors have a significantly negative impact on firm performance as 
measured by ROA and EPS, and this negative effect is more pronounced under the presence of high 
information costs. Similarly, using a sample of U.S. firms, Duchin et al. (2010) report that adding outside 
directors to the board worsens performance when the cost of information is high. The finding suggests 
that some firms keep the number of outside directors low for optimal reasons, and the one-size-fits-all 
approach of the new board regulations may not be ideal. In turn, the time and effort needed to obtain 
information in firms with high information costs might shy highly reputed directors away.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary 
This study examines the effectiveness of corporate governance reform in Vietnam via the issuance of 
Circular 121 in 2012. It stipulates that listed firms must include at least one-third of independent directors 
on the board. Circular 121 is expected to curtail the earnings management problem among listed firms by 
increasing the board independence. Based on the sample of 523 non-financial listed firms from 2009 – 
2016, this study does not find a significant relationship between board independence and absolute 
discretionary accruals among Vietnamese listed firms. This relationship remains insignificant under the 
presence of Circular 121. These results are consistent across three regression models (i.e. FEM, REM, and 
OLS) and various robustness tests. Therefore, the two hypotheses of this study are rejected, meaning that 
having a higher percentage of independent directors on the board does not help to reduce earnings 
management and corporate governance reform does not improve the situation. This finding may reflect 
unique characteristics of the Vietnamese capital market which is young and transitional. 
The formerly centralized and planned economy is still anchored in business practices which may disrupt 
the market conditions. The formerly commanded economy management styles such as manipulations, 
information asymmetry, advocacy groups, and State interventions still influence heavily on Vietnamese 
economy (Nguyen, 2014). Therefore,’ governance practices still need time to adapt to economic changes. 
These notions are reflected in the results of my study. Not only board independence but also the majority 
of other corporate governance variables such as the presence of women directors and ownership 
structure have no significant impact on controlling the opportunistic behavior of managers. 
Another distinctive feature of the Vietnamese market is a flawed regulatory system. According to McGee 
(2009) weak corporate governance in Vietnam is due to the following reasons: (i) Laws and regulations 
have many conflicts and inconsistencies; (ii) There are no sanctions for firms that fail to follow corporate 
governance rules; and (iii) Investment environment lacks information disclosure and transparency. Under 
these circumstances, independent directors, especially those who do not have extensive experience, face 
various barriers to effectively undertake their roles.  
 
5.2 Implications  
My study contributes to the body of research examining the effect of corporate governance reform in 
developing countries. The insignificant result of board independence indicates that simply adding more 
independent directors does not help to improve earnings reporting in Vietnam. This finding is contrasting 
to the mainstream literature of advanced economies. However, it may be more consistent with several 
unique characteristics of the Vietnamese transitional economy. The Vietnamese economy has several 
unique governance issues not prevalent in most of the developed markets. Particularly, in the case of a 
post-war economy transitioning towards a market economy, the private sector is relatively young, and 
“private firms require managerial competencies that did not exist before under the centralized and 
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planned economy” (Vu et al., 2018, p.513). Consequently, my study provides practical implications that 
cannot be drawn from studies in advanced countries. To my knowledge, this study is the first to examine 
the impact of corporate governance reform in constraining earnings management. My study employs data 
collected from a large sample of all non-financial listed company in Vietnam and thus, have relatively high 
generalizability. The results are also robust as variables are measured by different proxies. 
Beside theoretical insights, my study also provides several implications for policy-makers. The most 
important implication is that Vietnamese authorities need to further strengthen the regulatory and 
enforcement framework as corporate governance reform does not automatically become effective. 
Countries that adopt foreign law are often underprepared for it or the changes it brings (Pistor, 2003). 
Under a flawed system, it is not surprising that not only board independence but also all the other 
corporate governance variables are ineffective monitoring mechanisms. The new regulation is not well 
incorporated into the institutional landscape and could not contribute to an institutional change.  
Additionally, regulation should be accompanied with detailed guidelines and frequent training to guide 
businesses and stakeholders in the process of change. Policy-makers may consider requiring certain 
qualities of independent directors such as experience, expertise, and qualifications. Market players should 
also pay attention to develop a corresponding market of independent directors to minimize a gap in 
quality when imposing a quantitative target on board independence. 
 
5.3 Limitation and suggestions for further research 
The first limitation of my study is the inability to collect data of independent directors that fully qualify 
the definition of Circular 121. As most companies do not provide information on large business partners, 
I could not check if independent directors are related to large suppliers or customers of the firms. In many 
cases, the professional background of directors is not disclosed so I could not check if independent 
directors have worked for an external auditor or legal advisor during the past 2 years. Consequently, the 
definition of “independent director” in my study only satisfies 3 out of 5 criteria as mandated by Circular 
121. Further study may choose a smaller sample and examine other different types of public documents 
such as financial statements, company prospectus, and resumes of directors to determine the exact 
relations of these directors to the firms.  
Second, due to the limitation of my dataset, explanations for the absence of a significant association 
between board independence and earnings management in the post-reform period is on a conjecture 
basis. Therefore, future research could search for additional data that take into account other 
characteristics of independent directors (i.e. tenure duration, age, qualifications, concurrent positions 
held at other companies) or the costs of information acquisition. Employing more variables relevant to 
the regression model can also reduce the omitted variables bias, a situation not uncommon in earnings 
management study (Dechow et al., 2012). 
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Third, the model in my study is infected with autocorrelation which may generate biased and inconsistent 
estimates of parameters. Although robust standard errors were applied as a remedy, the results of my 
study should be treated with conservatism. Further research on this topic in Vietnam may use other 
methods to measure earnings management and other independent variables. 
Besides, future studies may investigate the effectiveness of Decree 71/2017/ND-CP established in 2017 
and compare it with Circular 121.  Decree 71 replaced Circular 121 and a stricter requirement for 
independent directors: they must not hold more than 1% of the shares in the company (compared to 5% 
as mandated by Circular 121). Besides this rule, Decree 71 also stipulates that from Aug 1st, 2020, the CEO 
of a listed company is not allowed to concurrently hold the position of the Board Chairman. Therefore, 
Decree 71 may be more effective than Circular 121 in curtailing earnings management. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Mean absolute discretionary accruals and mean board independence by industry 
Industry Firms Firms (%) 
Mean 
IND 
Mean 
AbsDA 
Manufacturing 189 36.1% 0.39  0.11  
Construction 88 16.8% 0.40  0.11  
Wholesale and retail trade 65 12.4% 0.40  0.12  
General storage 43 8.2% 0.44  0.11  
Utilities 32 6.1% 0.39  0.08  
Real estate 28 5.4% 0.45  0.13  
Transportation 27 5.2% 0.46  0.12  
Mining 26 5.0% 0.46  0.10  
Information and communication 25 4.8% 0.42  0.11  
Total 3774 100.0% 0.41 0.12 
 
Appendix 2: VIFs of main variables in the main model and alternative model 
Variable VIF 1/VIF  Variable VIF 1/VIF 
FIRM_SIZE 1.72 0.580  FIRM_SIZE 1.79 0.557 
ROA 1.65 0.607  OWN_STATE_2 1.47 0.680 
OCF 1.61 0.620  BIG4 1.37 0.728 
LEV 1.58 0.634  OWN_CON_D 1.37 0.732 
OWN_STATE 1.51 0.663  LEV_LOAN 1.31 0.760 
OWN_CON 1.42 0.703  OWN_FOR 1.24 0.805 
BIG4 1.37 0.730  OCF_A 1.18 0.848 
OWN_FOR 1.29 0.776  BOARD_SIZE 1.17 0.851 
OWN_MNG 1.21 0.827  ROE 1.17 0.853 
BOARD_SIZE 1.18 0.850  OWN_MNG 1.16 0.862 
GROWTH_A 1.17 0.852  DUAL 1.14 0.875 
IND 1.16 0.863  IND 1.13 0.882 
DUAL 1.15 0.871  POST121 1.13 0.882 
REFORM 1.13 0.884  WOMEN 1.06 0.945 
WOMEN 1.06 0.939  GROWTH_S 1.01 0.994 
Mean VIF 1.35    Mean VIF 1.25   
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Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full period (2009 – 2016) 
 Full period (2009 – 2016) 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
AbsDA 3763 0.112 0.113 0.002 0.035 0.080 0.148 0.627 
Positive_DA 1778 0.114 0.118 0.000 0.032 0.078 0.151 0.551 
Negative_DA 1985 -0.106 0.094 -0.422 -0.146 -0.081 -0.038 0.000 
NED 3764 0.595 0.194 0.000 0.400 0.600 0.800 1.000 
IND 3746 0.410 0.222 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600 1.000 
IND_D 3746 0.941 0.236 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BOARD_SIZE 3774 5.474 1.135 3.000 5.000 5.000 6.000 11.000 
DUAL 3770 0.332 0.471 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
WOMEN 3770 0.483 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
OWN_CON 3733 0.486 0.210 0.000 0.350 0.510 0.628 0.980 
OWN_CON_D 3733 0.570 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
OWN_MNG 3722 0.087 0.122 0.000 0.005 0.028 0.125 0.650 
OWN_FOR 3731 0.068 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.084 0.800 
OWN_STATE 3749 0.231 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.510 0.967 
OWN_STATE_2 3749 0.115 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.260 0.935 
BIG4 3746 0.215 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
FIRM_SIZE (€ mil.) 3774 68.685 231.33 0.434 7.322 18.770 52.796   6,683  
LEV 3774 0.499 0.219 0.014 0.324 0.525 0.673 0.967 
LEV_LOAN 3774 0.227 0.191 0.000 0.044 0.204 0.367 0.758 
GROWTH_A 3773 0.231 5.035 -0.599 -0.021 0.078 0.216 4.600 
GROWTH_S 3771 0.511 10.289 -0.990 -0.057 0.094 0.264 59.268 
ROA 3774 0.066 0.085 -0.472 0.020 0.051 0.098 0.588 
ROE 3774 0.124 0.263 -2.401 0.052 0.123 0.195 0.863 
OCF 3763 0.132 0.209 -0.709 0.023 0.110 0.216 1.831 
OCF_A 3763 0.150 0.202 -0.662 0.039 0.130 0.237 1.488 
AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent 
directors on the board. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive position 
in the firm or related parties of the firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major 
shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, or external auditors of the firm.  
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Panel B: Pre-reform (2009 – 2012) 
 Pre-reform (2009 – 2012) 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
AbsDA 1694 -0.002 0.151 -0.422 -0.086 -0.003 0.070 0.551 
Positive_DA 828 0.110 0.113 0.001 0.031 0.074 0.147 0.551 
Negative_DA 866 -0.109 0.096 -0.422 -0.150 -0.082 -0.039 -0.001 
NED 1695 0.564 0.195 0.000 0.400 0.600 0.714 1.000 
IND 1678 0.373 0.220 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.556 1.000 
IND_D 1678 0.908 0.290 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BOARD_SIZE 1705 5.450 1.164 0.000 5.000 5.000 6.000 11.000 
DUAL 1701 0.406 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
WOMEN 1701 0.426 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
OWN_CON 1666 0.469 0.205 0.000 0.339 0.510 0.608 0.910 
OWN_CON_D 1666 0.548 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OWN_MNG 1656 0.074 0.119 0.000 0.003 0.020 0.089 0.625 
OWN_FOR 1670 0.055 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.060 0.800 
OWN_STATE 1683 0.273 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.260 0.510 0.872 
OWN_STATE_2 1683 0.134 0.135 0.154 0.000 0.068 0.260 0.935 
BIG4 1677 0.185 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
FIRM_SIZE (€ mil.) 1705 54.370 143.636 0.434 2067.588 6.782 16.663 43.333 
LEV 1705 0.508 0.214 0.036 0.333 0.541 0.673 0.948 
LEV_LOAN 1705 0.233 0.194 0.000 0.045 0.215 0.377 0.747 
GROWTH_A 1704 0.350 7.475 -0.413 -0.009 0.110 0.259 3.104 
GROWTH_S 1704 0.395 4.537 -0.920 -0.039 0.135 0.322 23.140 
ROA 1705 0.075 0.084 -0.194 0.024 0.057 0.108 0.547 
ROE 1705 0.151 0.145 -0.505 0.067 0.142 0.221 0.764 
OCF 1694 0.142 0.213 -0.591 0.022 0.118 0.236 1.078 
OCF_A 1694 0.182 0.212 -0.395 0.058 0.153 0.282 1.188 
AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent directors 
on the board. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive position in the firm or 
related parties of the firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large 
suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, or external auditors of the firm.  
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Panel C: Post-reform (2013 – 2016) 
 Post-reform (2013 – 2016) 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
AbsDA 2069 -0.002 0.154 -0.422 -0.087 -0.011 0.069 0.551 
Positive_DA 1119 -0.104 0.092 -0.422 -0.143 -0.080 -0.037 -0.001 
Negative_DA 950 0.117 0.122 0.001 0.033 0.080 0.158 0.551 
NED 2069 0.620 0.189 0.000 0.500 0.600 0.800 1.000 
IND 2068 0.441 0.220 0.000 0.211 0.400 0.600 1.000 
IND_D 2068 0.968 0.176 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BOARD_SIZE 2069 5.493 1.109 3.000 5.000 5.000 6.000 11.000 
DUAL 2069 0.272 0.445 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
WOMEN 2069 0.530 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OWN_CON 2067 0.500 0.212 0.000 0.360 0.519 0.650 0.980 
OWN_CON_D 2067 0.591 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OWN_MNG 2066 0.097 0.123 0.000 0.007 0.040 0.154 0.650 
OWN_FOR 2061 0.078 0.123 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.103 0.779 
OWN_STATE 2066 0.196 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.466 0.958 
OWN_STATE_2 2066 0.099 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.218 0.935 
BIG4 2069 0.240 0.427 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
FIRM_SIZE (€ mil.) 2069 80.483 283.42 0.502 7.862 20.265 61.799 6683.4 
LEV 2069 0.492 0.223 0.014 0.316 0.512 0.673 0.967 
LEV_LOAN 2069 0.222 0.188 0.000 0.044 0.194 0.356 0.736 
GROWTH_A 2069 0.132 0.458 -0.547 -0.033 0.053 0.180 3.749 
GROWTH_S 2067 0.607 13.273 -0.990 -0.072 0.071 0.207 29.556 
ROA 2069 0.059 0.084 -0.365 0.016 0.046 0.090 0.552 
ROE 2069 0.102 0.328 -2.401 0.044 0.108 0.177 0.711 
OCF 2069 0.124 0.205 -0.591 0.025 0.104 0.204 1.398 
OCF_A 2069 0.123 0.191 -0.601 0.026 0.112 0.202 1.175 
AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent 
directors on the board. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive position 
in the firm or related parties of the firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major 
shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, or external auditors of the firm. 
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Appendix 4: Regression results of the main model using FEM 
 
Exp. 
sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
IND - -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 
  (-0.10) (-0.48) (-0.44) (-0.43) (-0.48) (-0.60) (-0.67) 
REFORM -  -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
   (-0.38) (-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.51) (-0.60) (-0.71) 
IND*REFORM -  0.012 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.015 0.014 
   (0.70) (0.67) (0.69) (0.84) (0.89) (0.85) 
BOARD_SIZE ? -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.85) (-0.80) 
DUAL + 0 0.001  0 0 -0 0 
  (0.04) (0.07)  (0.02) (0.07) (-0.01) (0.05) 
WOMEN - 0.013** 0.013**  0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.013** 
  (2.01) (1.98)  (2.10) (2.15) (2.06) (2.04) 
OWN_CON - -0.035* -0.035* -0.035* -0.036*    
  (-1.71) (-1.74) (-1.72) (-1.80)    
OWN_MNG ? -0.003 -0.002 -0.003  -0.003   
  (-0.13) (-0.11) (-0.12)  (-0.15)   
OWN_FOR - -0.008 -0.009 -0.010   -0.012  
  (-0.35) (-0.37) (-0.40)   (-0.49)  
OWN_STATE + -0.021 -0.020 -0.022    -0.026* 
  (-1.38) (-1.29) (-1.40)    (-1.66) 
BIG4 - -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.005 -0.007 
  (-0.67) (-0.69) (-0.64) (-0.60) (-0.92) (-0.49) (-0.70) 
FIRM_SIZE - -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0 -0.002 
  (-0.07) (-0.21) (-0.11) (-0.11) (-0.21) (-0.04) (-0.22) 
LEV + 0.026 0.028 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.031 
  (0.86) (0.92) (0.86) (0.92) (0.93) (0.86) (1.02) 
GROWTH_A + 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
  (5.91) (5.85) (5.87) (5.92) (5.91) (5.88) (5.93) 
ROA - -0.140** -0.139** -0.141** -0.142** -0.141** -0.148*** -0.144** 
  (-2.47) (-2.42) (-2.45) (-2.48) (-2.49) (-2.60) (-2.54) 
OCF - 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
  (3.02) (3.03) (3.01) (3.08) (3.09) (3.02) (3.06) 
Constant  0.131 0.148 0.144 0.131 0.126 0.108 0.131 
  (1.38) (1.43) (1.38) (1.29) (1.22) (1.05) (1.26) 
N  3624 3624 3624 3682 3674 3677 3694 
R-square within   0.101 0.102 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.101 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is FEM with robust standard error clustered by firm. Dependent 
variable AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent directors on the 
board. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive position in the firm or related parties of the 
firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal 
advisors, or external auditors of the firm. *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 
5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 5: Regression results of the main model using REM  
 Exp. sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
IND - -0.003 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.014 
  (-0.29) (-0.85) (-0.84) (-0.75) (-0.66) (-0.75) (-1.04) 
REFORM -  -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
   (-0.62) (-0.46) (-0.40) (-0.60) (-0.57) (-0.82) 
IND*REFORM -  0.015 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.017 
   (0.91) (0.87) (0.92) (1.01) (1.04) (1.08) 
BOARD_SIZE ? -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.003 -0.004* 
  (-1.87) (-1.88) (-1.85) (-1.86) (-1.76) (-1.60) (-1.91) 
DUAL + -0.004 -0.004  -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  (-0.78) (-0.76)  (-0.65) (-0.40) (-0.55) (-0.72) 
WOMEN - 0.006 0.006  0.007* 0.007* 0.008* 0.006 
  (1.38) (1.36)  (1.68) (1.76) (1.82) (1.43) 
OWN_CON - -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.017    
  (-0.54) (-0.60) (-0.49) (-1.56)    
OWN_MNG ? -0.003 -0.002 -0.005  0.001   
  (-0.17) (-0.12) (-0.30)  (0.06)   
OWN_FOR - -0.025 -0.025 -0.025   -0.021  
  (-1.51) (-1.50) (-1.48)   (-1.34)  
OWN_STATE + -0.023** -0.022** -0.024**    -0.023** 
  (-2.35) (-2.24) (-2.42)    (-2.49) 
BIG4 - -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 
  (-0.95) (-0.92) (-0.96) (-1.12) (-1.44) (-1.07) (-1.21) 
FIRM_SIZE - -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
  (-0.96) (-1.01) (-0.93) (-1.33) (-1.37) (-1.20) (-1.49) 
LEV + 0.002 0.002 0 0.003 0.002 -0 0.006 
  (0.12) (0.14) (0.03) (0.19) (0.18) (-0.01) (0.42) 
GROWTH_A + 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 
  (5.96) (5.93) (5.95) (6.02) (6.05) (6.02) (6.03) 
ROA - -0.132** -0.131** -0.131** -0.135** -0.137** -0.142*** -0.131** 
  (-2.41) (-2.35) (-2.36) (-2.48) (-2.53) (-2.61) (-2.40) 
OCF - 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
  (3.37) (3.36) (3.34) (3.42) (3.40) (3.40) (3.40) 
Constant  0.155*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.162*** 0.153*** 0.149*** 0.163*** 
  (6.69) (6.73) (6.70) (6.85) (6.52) (6.38) (6.98) 
N  3624 3624 3624 3682 3674 3677 3694 
R-square within   0.099 0.099 0.098 0.099 0.098 0.099 0.099 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is REM with robust standard error clustered by firm. Dependent 
variable AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent directors on the 
board. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive position in the firm or related parties of the 
firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal 
advisors, or external auditors of the firm. *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 
5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 6: Regression results using the propensity of independent directors (IND_D) as an alternative 
measurement of board independence 
  
Exp. 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
IND_D - -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 
  (-1.11) (-0.96) (-0.88) (-0.93) (-0.87) (-0.99) (-1.12) 
REFORM -  -0.008 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 
   (-0.44) (-0.33) (-0.20) (-0.25) (-0.27) (-0.42) 
IND_D*REFORM -  0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 
   (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.23) (0.16) 
BOARD_SIZE ? -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003* -0.004** 
  (-2.23) (-2.23) (-2.19) (-2.30) (-2.19) (-1.91) (-2.35) 
DUAL + -0.004 -0.004  -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.92) (-0.93)  (-0.98) (-0.65) (-1.00) (-1.01) 
WOMEN - 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 
  (1.15) (1.15)  (1.23) (1.33) (1.46) (1.18) 
OWN_CON - 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.009    
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (-0.94)    
OWN_MNG ? -0.011 -0.011 -0.014  -0.008   
  (-0.66) (-0.65) (-0.91)  (-0.51)   
OWN_FOR - -0.034** -0.034** -0.034**   -0.030**  
  (-2.09) (-2.09) (-2.09)   (-1.98)  
OWN_STATE + -0.015* -0.015* -0.016*    -0.012 
  (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.79)    (-1.52) 
BIG4 - -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 
  (-0.80) (-0.79) (-0.83) (-1.09) (-1.35) (-0.86) (-1.15) 
FIRM_SIZE - -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003* -0.003** 
  (-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.43) (-2.13) (-2.07) (-1.78) (-2.20) 
LEV + -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 
  (-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.36) (-0.11) (-0.13) (-0.43) (0.10) 
GROWTH_A + 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
  (5.59) (5.59) (5.60) (5.71) (5.71) (5.69) (5.69) 
ROA - -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.145*** -0.147*** -0.139*** 
  (-2.62) (-2.62) (-2.62) (-2.73) (-2.79) (-2.81) (-2.62) 
OCF - 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
  (3.41) (3.41) (3.39) (3.44) (3.44) (3.45) (3.44) 
Constant  0.167*** 0.168*** 0.165*** 0.173*** 0.168*** 0.162*** 0.175*** 
  (7.35) (7.22) (7.15) (7.62) (7.38) (7.09) (7.78) 
N  3624.000 3624.000 3624.000 3682.000 3674.000 3677.000 3694.000 
Adjusted R2  0.118 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is OLS with robust standard error clustered by firm. Dependent 
variable AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND_D is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if there is 
no independent director on the board, and 1 otherwise. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive 
position in the firm or related parties of the firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large 
suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, or external auditors of the firm. *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient 
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 7: Regression results using alternative measurement of control variables 
  
Exp. 
sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
IND - 0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 
  (0.39) (-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.30) (-0.17) (-0.14) (-0.55) 
REFORM -  -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.015 
   (-1.05) (-0.85) (-1.03) (-1.02) (-0.90) (-1.34) 
IND*REFORM -  0.014 0.013 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.018 
   (0.84) (0.77) (1.00) (0.89) (1.01) (1.13) 
BOARD_SIZE ? -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.006*** 
  (-2.98) (-3.00) (-2.94) (-3.21) (-2.95) (-2.57) (-3.21) 
DUAL + -0.005 -0.006  -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
  (-1.32) (-1.37)  (-1.53) (-0.94) (-1.39) (-1.54) 
WOMEN - 0.004 0.004  0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 
  (1.16) (1.15)  (1.17) (1.35) (1.55) (1.09) 
OWN_CON_D - -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008**    
  (-0.88) (-0.91) (-0.79) (-2.02)    
OWN_MNG ? -0.017 -0.015 -0.021  -0.014   
  (-1.00) (-0.89) (-1.29)  (-0.85)   
OWN_FOR - -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.046***   -0.042***  
  (-2.77) (-2.75) (-2.73)   (-2.60)  
OWN_STATE_2 + -0.028* -0.028* -0.028*    -0.026** 
  (-1.85) (-1.85) (-1.90)    (-2.02) 
BIG4 - -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.011** -0.012** -0.010* -0.012** 
  (-1.76) (-1.73) (-1.74) (-2.17) (-2.47) (-1.92) (-2.32) 
FIRM_SIZE - 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
  (1.00) (0.98) (1.05) (0.21) (0.17) (0.44) (0.29) 
LEV_LOAN + -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 
  (-0.64) (-0.64) (-0.73) (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.62) (-0.37) 
GROWTH_S + -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.55) (-0.04) (-0.27) (-0.31) (-0.28) 
ROE - -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.044*** 
  (-2.95) (-2.95) (-2.92) (-3.00) (-3.02) (-3.00) (-3.04) 
OCF_A - 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 
  (7.30) (7.30) (7.28) (7.38) (7.36) (7.32) (7.38) 
Constant  0.115*** 0.119*** 0.115*** 0.130*** 0.125*** 0.115*** 0.130*** 
  (5.11) (5.18) (5.02) (5.85) (5.60) (5.09) (5.91) 
N  3622.000 3622.000 3622.000 3680.000 3672.000 3675.000 3692.000 
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.072 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is OLS with robust standard error clustered by firm. Dependent 
variable AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent directors on the 
board. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive position in the firm or related parties of the 
firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, 
or external auditors of the firm. *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Appendix 8: Regression results when removing 2012 
  
Exp. 
sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
IND - -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 
  (-0.22) (-0.31) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.26) (-0.35) (-0.59) 
REFORM -  0.009 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.010 
   (0.70) (0.78) (1.01) (0.84) (1.08) (0.81) 
IND*REFORM -  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 
   (0.21) (0.18) (0.20) (0.26) (0.29) (0.37) 
BOARD_SIZE - -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003* 
  (-1.68) (-1.69) (-1.67) (-1.64) (-1.55) (-1.36) (-1.68) 
DUAL + -0.003 -0.003  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
  (-0.59) (-0.60)  (-0.47) (-0.44) (-0.60) (-0.51) 
WOMEN - 0.003 0.003  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.72) (0.72)  (0.88) (0.90) (0.97) (0.83) 
OWN_CON - 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.004    
  (0.47) (0.46) (0.55) (-0.32)    
OWN_MNG ? -0.002 -0.001 -0.004  0.005   
  (-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.20)  (0.23)   
OWN_FOR - -0.039** -0.039** -0.039**   -0.037**  
  (-2.04) (-2.03) (-2.03)   (-1.99)  
OWN_STATE + -0.017 -0.017 -0.017    -0.012 
  (-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.57)    (-1.21) 
BIG4 - -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
  (-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.83) (-1.05) (-1.25) (-0.81) (-1.02) 
FIRM_SIZE - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.45) (-1.16) (-1.05) (-0.76) (-1.19) 
LEV + 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.009 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.44) (0.44) (0.12) (0.63) 
GROWTH_A + 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
  (5.19) (5.19) (5.20) (5.31) (5.32) (5.27) (5.29) 
ROA - -0.092 -0.092 -0.092 -0.093 -0.093 -0.097 -0.088 
  (-1.34) (-1.33) (-1.33) (-1.40) (-1.39) (-1.45) (-1.30) 
OCF - 0.056* 0.056* 0.056* 0.056* 0.056* 0.057** 0.055* 
  (1.91) (1.91) (1.90) (1.91) (1.91) (1.96) (1.91) 
Constant  0.128*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.136*** 0.131*** 0.125*** 0.139*** 
  (4.85) (4.82) (4.77) (5.21) (5.04) (4.75) (5.37) 
N  2615.000 2615.000 2615.000 2664.000 2654.000 2662.000 2675.000 
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.102 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is OLS with robust standard error clustered by firm. 
Dependent variable AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent 
directors on the board. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive position in the firm or 
related parties of the firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large suppliers, 
large customers, legal advisors, or external auditors of the firm. *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient 
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 9: Regression results of sample partition  
 Exp. AbsDA  DA_Positive  DA_Negative 
 sign Pre  Post  Pre  Post  Pre  Post 
IND - -0.004 -0.004   0.019 0.004   0.032** 0.015 
  (-0.32) (-0.30)  (1.16) (0.25)  (2.04) (1.20) 
BOARD_SIZE ? -0.001 -0.006***  -0.000 -0.009***  -0.003 -0.000 
  (-0.47) (-2.74)  (-0.12) (-3.07)  (-0.70) (-0.11) 
DUAL + -0.001 -0.006  0.009 -0.001  0.005 0.005 
  (-0.09) (-1.07)  (1.24) (-0.09)  (0.67) (0.84) 
WOMEN - 0.001 0.008  0.009 0.005  0.003 -0.005 
  (0.17) (1.55)  (1.31) (0.74)  (0.43) (-0.99) 
OWN_CON - 0.011 -0.011  0.014 -0.014  -0 -0.021 
  (0.57) (-0.78)  (0.63) (-0.81)  (-0.02) (-1.52) 
OWN_MNG ? 0.021 -0.035*  0.030 -0.005  0.029 0.046** 
  (0.74) (-1.67)  (0.93) (-0.18)  (1.03) (2.09) 
OWN_FOR - -0.048* -0.022  -0.047 -0.020  0.032 0.004 
  (-1.77) (-1.13)  (-1.42) (-0.82)  (1.16) (0.19) 
OWN_STATE + -0.004 -0.020*  -0.003 -0.031**  0.009 0.006 
  (-0.29) (-1.77)  (-0.16) (-2.12)  (0.49) (0.46) 
BIG4 - -0.007 -0.004  -0.009 -0.010  -0.003 0 
  (-0.88) (-0.68)  (-0.98) (-1.25)  (-0.32) (0.06) 
FIRM_SIZE - -0.001 -0.003  -0.003 0.004  -0 0.006*** 
  (-0.48) (-1.60)  (-1.09) (1.33)  (-0.10) (2.65) 
LEV + -0.025 0.013  0.042** 0.047**  0.010 0.007 
  (-1.43) (0.84)  (2.04) (2.12)  (0.48) (0.42) 
GROWTH_A + 0.094*** 0.055***  0.076*** 0.041**  0.021 0.015* 
  (6.33) (4.40)  (3.19) (2.25)  (1.28) (1.72) 
ROE - -0.067 -0.207***  -0.347*** -0.332***  -0.315*** -0.236** 
  (-0.75) (-3.67)  (-4.11) (-4.08)  (-2.78) (-2.26) 
CFO_WC3_LTA - 0.053 0.102***  0.293*** 0.294***  0.233*** 0.323*** 
  (1.48) (3.29)  (6.02) (6.12)  (5.99) (9.76) 
Constant  0.124*** 0.155***  0.025 0.050  -0.129** -0.164*** 
  (3.51) (6.00)  (0.69) (1.37)  (-2.49) (-5.69) 
N  1572 2052  771 946  801 1106 
Adjusted R-square   0.113 0.131   0.389 0.383   0.126 0.214 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses. The regression approach is OLS with robust standard error clustered by firm. Dependent 
variable AbsDA is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. IND is the proportion of independent directors on the 
board. An independent director is defined as not holding an executive position in the firm or related parties of the 
firm, and not having a direct relationship with any major shareholders, large suppliers, large customers, legal advisors, 
or external auditors of the firm. *, **, or *** indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% 
level, respectively. 
  
67 
 
REFERENCES 
Abdul Rahman, R., & Haneem Mohamed Ali, F. (2006). Board, audit committee, culture and earnings 
management: Malaysian evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(7), 783–804. 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and 
performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291–309. 
Ali, A., & Zhang, W. (2015). CEO tenure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 59(1), 60–79. 
Arun, T. G., Almahrog, Y. E., & Ali Aribi, Z. (2015). Female directors and earnings management: Evidence 
from UK companies. International Review of Financial Analysis, 39, 137–146. 
Bai, C.-E., Liu, Q., Lu, J., Song, F. M., & Zhang, J. (2004). Corporate governance and market valuation in 
China. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(4), 599–616. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2013). Econometric analysis of panel data (Fifth Edition.). Chichester, West Sussex: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Bao, S. R., & Lewellyn, K. B. (2017). Ownership structure and earnings management in emerging 
markets—An institutionalized agency perspective. International Business Review, 26(5), 828–
838. 
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management, 17(1), 
99–120. 
Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition 
and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 71(4), 443–465. 
Becker, C. L., Defond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J., & Subramanyam, K. R. (1998). The effect of audit quality on 
earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 15(1), 1–24. 
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2008). Corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 14(3), 257–273. 
Bliss, B. A., Cheng, Y., & Denis, D. J. (2015). Corporate payout, cash retention, and the supply of credit: 
Evidence from the 2008–2009 credit crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 115(3), 521–540. 
Bowen, R. M., Burgstahler, D., & Daley, L. A. (1987). The incremental information content of accrual 
versus cash flows. The Accounting Review, 62(4), 723–747. 
Bozec, Y. (2008). Ownership concentration, separation of voting rights from cash flow rights, and 
earnings management: an empirical study in Canada. Canadian Journal of Administrative 
Sciences, 25(1), 1–15. 
Bradley, R. L. (2009). Capitalism at work: business, government, and energy. Political capitalism. Salem, 
MA: M & M Scrivener Press. 
68 
 
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Properties of Accounting Earnings, 24(1), 99–126. 
Campa, D. (2019). Earnings management strategies during financial difficulties: A comparison between 
listed and unlisted French companies. Research in International Business and Finance, 50, 457–
471. 
Chen, H., Chen, J. Z., Lobo, G. J., & Wang, Y. (2011). Effects of audit quality on earnings management and 
cost of equity capital: Evidence from China: Effects of audit quality in China. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 28(3), 892–925. 
Chen, J. J., & Zhang, H. (2014). The impact of the corporate governance code on earnings management - 
evidence from Chinese listed companies. European Financial Management, 20(3), 596–632. 
Chen, K. Y., Elder, R. J., & Hsieh, Y.-M. (2007). Corporate governance and earnings management: The 
implications of corporate governance best-practice principles for Taiwanese listed companies. 
Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 3(2), 73–105. 
Chen, X., Cheng, Q., & Wang, X. (2015). Does increased board independence reduce earnings 
management? Evidence from recent regulatory reforms. Review of Accounting Studies, 20(2), 
899–933. 
Cheung, Y.-L., Jiang, P., Limpaphayom, P., & Lu, T. (2008). Does corporate governance matter in China? 
China Economic Review, 19(3), 460–479. 
Chung, H., Sheu, H.-J., & Wang, J.-L. (2009). Do firms’ earnings management practices affect their equity 
liquidity? Finance Research Letters, 6(3), 152–158. 
Claessens, S., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey. Emerging 
Markets Review, 15, 1–33. 
Cohen, D. A., Dey, A., & Lys, T. Z. (2008). Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and 
post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The Accounting Review, 83(3), 757–787. 
Connelly, J. T., Limpaphayom, P., Nguyen, H. T., & Tran, T. D. (2017). A tale of two cities: Economic 
development, corporate governance and firm value in Vietnam. Research in International 
Business and Finance, 42, 102–123. 
Davidson, S., Stickney, C. P., & Weil, R. L. (1987). Accounting: the language of business (7th ed.). Sun 
Lakes, Ariz: T. Horton. 
Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their 
determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2–3), 344–401. 
Dechow, P. M., & Dichev, I. D. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual estimation 
errors. The Accounting Review, 77, 35–59. 
Dechow, P. M., & Ge, W. (2006). The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the role of special 
items: Implications for the accrual anomaly. Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2–3), 253–296. 
69 
 
Dechow, P. M., Hutton, A. P., Kim, J. H., & Sloan, R. G. (2012). Detecting earnings management: A new 
approach. Journal of Accounting Research, 50(2), 275–334. 
Dechow, P. M., Richardson, S. A., & Tuna, I. (2003). Why are earnings kinky? An examination of the 
earnings management explanation. Review of Accounting Studies, 8(2/3), 355–384. 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995). Detecting earnings management. The Accounting 
Review, 70(2), 193–225. 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings 
manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 13(1), 1–36. 
DeFond, M. L., & Jiambalvo, J. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 17(1), 145–176. 
DeFond, M. L., & Park, C. W. (1997). Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 23(2), 115–139. 
Dichev, I. D., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2013). Earnings quality: Evidence from the field. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56(2–3), 1–33. 
Ding, Y., Zhang, H., & Zhang, J. (2007). Private vs State ownership and earnings management: evidence 
from Chinese listed companies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 223–238. 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and 
shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 49–64. 
Douma, S., George, R., & Kabir, R. (2006). Foreign and domestic ownership, business groups, and firm 
performance: evidence from a large emerging market. Strategic Management Journal, 27(7), 
637–657. 
DuCharme, L. L., Malatesta, P. H., & Sefcik, S. E. (2004). Earnings management, stock issues, and 
shareholder lawsuits. Journal of Financial Economics, 71(1), 27–49. 
Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., & Ozbas, O. (2010). When are outside directors effective? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 96(2), 195–214. 
Duong, N. H., Nguyen, D. T., & Nguyen, T. L. (2017). The impact of equitization on firm performance: The 
case of Vietnam. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 68–74(164), 7. 
Essa, S. A. G., Kabir, R., & Nguyen, H. T. (2016). Does corporate governance affect earnings 
management? Evidence from Vietnam. Hanoi, Viet Nam. 
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26(2), 301–325. 
Gavious, I., Segev, E., & Yosef, R. (2012). Female directors and earnings management in high‐technology 
firms. Pacific Accounting Review, 24(1), 4–32. 
70 
 
Germain, L., Galy, N., & Lee, W. (2014). Corporate governance reform in Malaysia: Board size, 
independence and monitoring. Journal of Economics and Business, 75, 126–162. 
Guenther, D. A. (1994). Earnings management in response to corporate tax rate changes: Evidence from 
the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The Accounting Review, 69(1), 230–243. 
Guo, J., Huang, P., Zhang, Y., & Zhou, N. (2015). Foreign ownership and real earnings management: 
Evidence from Japan. Journal of International Accounting Research, 14(2), 185–213. 
Hair, J. F. (Ed.). (2014). Multivariate data analysis (Seventh Edition.). Harlow: Pearson. 
Heath, J., & Norman, W. (2004). Stakeholder theory, corporate governance and public management: 
what can the history of state-run enterprises teach us in the post-Enron era? Journal of Business 
Ethics, 53(3), 247–265. 
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their 
monitoring of the CEO. The American Economic Review, 88(1), 96–118. 
Hoang, T., Abeysekera, I., & Ma, S. (2014). State ownership and earnings management: empirical 
evidence from Vietnamese listed firms (pp. 257–268). Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. 
Hoang, T. C., Abeysekera, I., & Ma, S. (2017). The effect of board diversity on earnings quality: an 
empirical study of listed firms in Vietnam: Effect of board diversity on earnings quality. 
Australian Accounting Review, 27(2), 146–163. 
Hooghiemstra, R., & van Manen, J. (2004). The Independence Paradox: (im)possibilities facing non-
executive directors in The Netherlands. Corporate Governance, 12(3), 314–324. 
Houqe, N., Zijl, T., Dunstan, K., & Karim, Waresul. (2011). Does corporate governance affect earnings 
quality: Evidence from an emerging market. A T Business Review, 7(3), 48–57. 
Hsiao, C. (2014). Analysis of panel data (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 
August 3, 2020, from http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781139839327. 
Huse, M., & Grethe Solberg, A. (2006). Gender‐related boardroom dynamics: How Scandinavian women 
make and can make contributions on corporate boards. Women in Management Review, 21(2), 
113–130. 
International Finance Corporation. (2010, October). Vietnam corporate governance manual. 
International Finance Corporation. Retrieved from 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region__ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/east+
asia+and+the+pacific/resources/vietnam+corporate+governance+manual. 
Jaggi, B., & Leung, S. (2007). Impact of family dominance on monitoring of earnings management by 
audit committees: Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation, 16(1), 27–50. 
James, B. J., & Joseph, C. (2015). Corporate governance mechanisms and bank performance: resource-
based view. Procedia Economics and Finance, 31, 117–123. 
71 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. 
The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880. 
Jensen, M. C. (2001). Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 22(1), 32–42. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. 
Jiraporn, P., Miller, G. A., Yoon, S. S., & Kim, Y. S. (2008). Is earnings management opportunistic or 
beneficial? An agency theory perspective. International Review of Financial Analysis, 17(3), 622–
634. 
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 29(2), 193. 
Kim, H. J., & Yoon, S. S. (2008). The impact of corporate governance on earnings management in Korea. 
Management & Accounting Review, 7(1), 43–59. 
Kim, K. A., Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, P., & Nofsinger, J. R. (2007). Large shareholders, board 
independence, and minority shareholder rights: Evidence from Europe. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 13(5), 859–880. 
Kinney, W., & McDaniel, L. S. (1989). Characteristics of firms correcting previously reported quarterly 
earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11(1), 71–93. Elsevier. 
Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375–400. 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. (2005). Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1), 163–197. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The 
Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471–517. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate 
governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1–2), 3–27. 
Lai, L. (2011). Monitoring of earnings management by independent directors and the impact of 
regulation: evidence from the People’s Republic of China. International Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Performance Evaluation, 7(1), 6–31. 
Le, T. H. A., Le, T. N. L., & Vu, T. H. (2016). The effect of corporate governance on earnings management 
of enterprises listed on Ho Chi Minh stock exchange, Vietnam. Hue University Journal of Science, 
113(14), 5–15. 
Lee, C.-W. J., Li, L. Y., & Yue, H. (2006). Performance, growth and earnings management. Review of 
Accounting Studies, 11(2–3), 305–334. 
72 
 
Lev, B. (1989). On the usefulness of earnings and earnings research: lessons and directions from two 
decades of empirical research. Journal of Accounting Research, 27, 153–192. 
Liu, J. S., & Yang, C. (2008). Corporate governance reform in Taiwan: could the independent director 
system be an effective remedy? Asian Survey, 48(5), 816–838. 
Liu, J., Uchida, K., & Gao, R. (2014). Earnings management of initial public offering firms: evidence from 
regulation changes in China. Accounting & Finance, 54(2), 505–537. 
Lo, A. W. Y., Wong, R. M. K., & Firth, M. (2010). Can corporate governance deter management from 
manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 16(2), 225–235. 
Lo, K. (2008). Earnings management and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 45(2–3), 
350–357. 
Lobo, G. J., & Zhou, J. (2009). Changes in discretionary financial reporting behavior following the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 25(1), 1–26. 
Maydew, E. L. (1997). Tax-induced earnings management by firms with net operating losses. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 35(1), 83–96. 
McGee, R. W. (2009). An overview of corporate governance practices in Vietnam. In R. W. McGee (Ed.), 
Corporate Governance in Developing Economies (pp. 235–238). Boston, MA: Springer US. 
Retrieved August 1, 2020, from http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-0-387-84833-4_30. 
McNichols, M. F. (2000). Research design issues in earnings management studies. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 19(4–5), 313–345. 
Meng, Y., Clements, M. P., & Padgett, C. (2018). Independent directors, information costs and foreign 
ownership in Chinese companies. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money, 53, 139–157. 
Muth, M., & Donaldson, L. (1998). Stewardship theory and board structure: a contingency approach. 
Corporate Governance, 6(1), 5–28. 
Ngo, H. Q. (2019). United Nations. United Nations. 
Nguyen, H., Oates, G., & Dunkley, M. (2014). A review of the establishment of the stock market in 
Vietnam–in relation to other transitional economies. International Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 6(10). 
Nguyen, T. T. M., Evans, E., & Lu, M. (2017). Independent directors, ownership concentration and firm 
performance in listed companies: Evidence from Vietnam. Pacific Accounting Review, 29(2), 
204–226. 
Nguyen, T. T. M., Evans, E., & Lu, M. (2019). Perceptions of independent directors about their roles of 
and challenges on corporate boards: Evidence from a survey in Vietnam. Asian Review of 
Accounting, 27(1), 69–96. 
73 
 
OECD. (2018). OECD investment policy reviews: Viet Nam 2018. OECD Investment Policy Reviews. OECD. 
Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-
investment-policy-reviews-viet-nam-2017_9789264282957-en. 
O’Reilly, C. A., Caldwell, D. F., & Barnett, W. P. (1989). Work group demography, social integration, and 
turnover. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(1), 21. 
Osma, B. G., & Noguer, B. G.-A. (2007). The effect of the board composition and its monitoring 
committees on earnings management: evidence from Spain. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 15(6), 1413–1428. 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2000). Accrual management to meet earnings targets: UK 
evidence pre- and post-Cadbury. The British Accounting Review, 32(4), 415–445. 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2005). Board monitoring and earnings management: do outside 
directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(7–8), 1311–
1346. 
Peteraf, M. A. (1993). The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based view. Strategic 
Management Journal, 14(3), 179–191. 
Pistor, K., Keinan, Y., Kleinheisterkamp, J., & West, M. (2002). Evolution of corporate law: A cross-
country comparison. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 23(4), 791–851. 
Romano, R. (2005). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance. Yale Law 
Review, 114, 1521–1611. 
Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 42(3), 335–370. 
Rusmin, R. (2010). Auditor quality and earnings management: Singaporean evidence. Managerial 
Auditing Journal, 25(7), 618–638. 
Sáenz González, J., & García-Meca, E. (2014a). Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings 
Management in Latin American Markets? Journal of Business Ethics, 121(3), 419–440. 
Sáenz González, J., & García-Meca, E. (2014b). Does corporate governance influence earnings 
management in Latin American markets? Journal of Business Ethics, 121(3), 419–440. 
Saona, P., Muro, L., & Alvarado, M. (2020). How do the ownership structure and board of directors’ 
features impact earnings management? The Spanish case. Journal of International Financial 
Management & Accounting, 31(1), 98–133. 
Sarkar, J., Sarkar, S., & Sen, K. (2008). Board of directors and opportunistic earnings management: 
Evidence from India. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 23(4), 517–551. 
Schmidheiny, K. (2019). Panel data: fixed and random effects. Unversitat Basel. Retrieved from 
https://www.schmidheiny.name/teaching/panel2up.pdf. 
74 
 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 
737–783. 
Statistical Documentation and Service Centre. (2020). General Statistics Office Of Vietnam. Retrieved 
March 15, 2020, from https://www.gso.gov.vn/Default_en.aspx?tabid=491. 
Subramanyam, K. R. (1996). The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
22(1–3), 249–281. 
Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., & Wong, T. J. (1998). Earnings management and the underperformance of 
seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, 63–99. 
To, A. T., & Suzuki, Y. (2019). The change in board independence in the presence of firm risk and 
regulation. Contaduría y Administración, 64(4), 1–22. 
Torres-Reyna, O. (2007). Panel data analysis: fixed and random effects using STATA. Princeton 
University. Retrieved from http://dss.princeton.edu/training. 
Tran, Q. T. (2020). Ownership structure and demand for independent directors: evidence from an 
emerging market. Journal of Economics and Development. 
Tran, T. H. L., & Holloway, D. A. (2014). Developments in corporate governance: The case of Vietnam. 
Corporate Ownership and Control, 11(3). Retrieved March 25, 2020, from 
http://www.virtusinterpress.org/DEVELOPMENTS-IN-CORPORATE.html. 
UNESCO Institute of Statistics. (2019). Vietnam. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from 
http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/vn. 
Uribe-Bohorquez, M.-V., Martínez-Ferrero, J., & García-Sánchez, I.-M. (2018). Board independence and 
firm performance: The moderating effect of institutional context. Journal of Business Research, 
88, 28–43. 
Vu, M.-C., Phan, T. T., & Le, N. T. (2018). Relationship between board ownership structure and firm 
financial performance in transitional economy: The case of Vietnam. Research in International 
Business and Finance, 45, 512–528. 
Vuong, Q. H., Napier, N. K., & Tran, T. D. (2013). A categorical data analysis on relationships between 
culture, creativity and business stage: the case of Vietnam. International Journal of Transitions 
and Innovation Systems, 3(1), 1–20. 
Wang, L., & Yung, K. (2011). Do state enterprises manage earnings more than privately owned firms? 
The case of China: Do state enterprises manage earnings? Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 38(7–8), 794–812. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1990). Positive accounting theory: a ten-year perspective. The 
Accounting Review, 65(1), 131–156. American Accounting Association. 
Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 431–
460. 
75 
 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5(2), 171–180. 
World Bank. (2020). The World Bank In Vietnam. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/vietnam/overview. 
Wright, M., Siegel, D. S., Keasey, K., & Filatotchev, I. (Eds.). (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Corporate 
Governance. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. 
Xie, B., Davidson, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate governance: the 
role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295–316. 
Yang, C., Lai, H., & Leing Tan, B. (2008). Managerial ownership structure and earnings management. 
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, 6(1), 35–53. 
Ye, K. (2014). Independent director cash compensation and earnings management. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 33(4), 391–400. 
York, R. (2012). Residualization is not the answer: Rethinking how to address multicollinearity. Social 
Science Research, 41(6), 1379–1386. 
Yu, F. (Frank). (2008). Analyst coverage and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 
88(2), 245–271. 
Zang, A. Y. (2011). Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based 
earnings management. The Accounting Review, 87(2), 675–703. American Accounting 
Association. 
Zingales, L. (1998). Corporate Governance. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. 
Retrieved March 8, 2020, from http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=46906. 
 
